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INTRODUCTION
In 2010, Robyn McEuen began working for a branch of AutoZone in
Cordova, Tennessee.1 She excelled in her position and was promoted to the
position of commercial specialist the following year.2 In 2012, McEuen was
required to report to a new store manager, Gustavus Townsel, who was
transferred to McEuen’s store from a diﬀerent branch.3 Immediately
thereafter, McEuen became the subject of disparaging, predatory, and
inappropriate remarks and actions made by Townsel—Townsel would grab
McEuen from behind, touch her genital region, and repeatedly proposition
McEuen despite her continual eﬀorts to rebuﬀ his advances.4 Townsel
subjected McEuen to this harassment for months while her co-workers turned
a blind eye to the conduct, reasoning that she must not have been that upset
because she would have reported it if she were.5
Robyn McEuen’s story is one of thousands of women who experience
sexual harassment in the workplace each year in the United States. In 2019,
there were 7,514 allegations of sexual harassment ﬁled with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).6 This number does not
Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Autozone, Inc., 692 F. App’x 280, 281 (6th Cir. 2017).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 281-82.
Id. at 282.
Charges Alleging Sex-Based Harassment (Charges Filed with EEOC) FY 2010-FY 2018,
EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement
/sexual_harassment_new.cfm [https://perma.cc/8LW5-3CUX].
1
2
3
4
5
6
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nearly represent the extent of the issue, as many instances of workplace
harassment go unreported. Studies have found that approximately less than
thirteen percent of victims of harassment ﬁle a formal complaint—a statistic
which may even be inﬂated.7
Since 2017, the rise of the #MeToo movement has brought greater
attention to issues of sexual harassment in the workplace.8 This movement
was founded by civil rights activist Tarana Burke, who created a nonproﬁt to
raise awareness and provide resources for women who have been victims of
sexual harassment and violence.9 The movement became a phenomenon
through social media in late 2017 after Alyssa Milano, a Hollywood actress,
posted on Twitter asking those who had “been sexually harassed or assaulted
[to] write ‘me too’” in response to her tweet.10 Hundreds of thousands posted
on the social media platform in response using the “MeToo” phrasing,
sparking a signiﬁcant social movement.11 This has brought great attention to
issues related to workplace harassment, resulting in walkouts,12 strikes,13 and

7 CHAI R. FELDBLUM & VICTORIA A. LIPNIC, EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
Selective Task Force on the Study of Harassment in the Workplace 16 (2016),
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_force/harassment/report.cfm#_ftnref63 [https://perma.cc/XC9V28NX]. As many women may never disclose that they are victims of workplace harassment, this
statistic is likely lower in actuality.
8 The #MeToo movement is not limited to giving a voice to those who have experienced
harassment in the workplace, but victims of harassment generally. See, e.g., ME TOO,
https://metoomvmt.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2019) [https://perma.cc/KT6A-2NU5]
(providing general information about the “me too” movement).
9 Sandra E. Garcia, The Woman Who Created #MeToo Long Before the Hashtags, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/20/us/me-too-movement-tarana-burke.html
[https://perma.cc/6XQ8-PJXE]. In creating her nonproﬁt, Just Be Inc., Burke “sought out the
resources that she had not found readily available . . . and committed herself to being there for
people who had been abused.” Id.
10 Alyssa
Milano (@Alyssa_Milano), TWITTER (Oct. 15, 2017, 1:21 PM),
https://twitter.com/Alyssa_Milano/status/919659438700670976 [https://perma.cc/MN93-YCBY].
Milano’s tweet was prompted in the wake of allegations of sexual assault and harassment against
Harvey Weinstein, a Hollywood producer. Garcia, supra note 9.
11 Rebecca Hanner White, Title VII and the #MeToo Movement, 68 EMORY L.J. ONLINE 1014,
1014 (2018), https://law.emory.edu/elj/elj-online/volume-68/essays/title-vii-me-too-movement.html
[https://perma.cc/G6NK-HC5R].
12 See, e.g., Jane Lanhee Lee & Paresh Dave, Google’s ‘#Metoo’ Moment: Workers Walk Out Over
Women’s Rights, REUTERS (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-alphabet-googleharassment/google-workers-walk-out-to-protest-office-harassment-inequality-idUSKCN1N644R
[https://perma.cc/CH27-JEYQ] (explaining how Google employees around the world walked out to
protest workplace harassment). Though the #MeToo movement is not limited to addressing issues of
harassment in the workplace, this Comment will focus on the movement as related to workplace
harassment and the changes that should follow.
13 See, e.g., Sarah Whitten, McDonald’s Employees Stage First #MeToo Strike, CNBC (Sept. 18,
2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/18/mcdonalds-employees-to-stage-first-metoo-strike.html
[https://perma.cc/4J25-X4Q7] (detailing how McDonald’s workers staged the “first multistate
walkout protesting sexual harassment” and carried signs that read “#MeToo McDonald’s”).

1064

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 168: 1061

attempts to inﬂuence state and congressional legislation.14 The support of this
movement may explain an increase in workplace harassment charges ﬁled
with the EEOC between 2017 and 2018.15 However, social movements can
only go so far to rectify the situation if the law surrounding the issue does
not aﬀord victims a remedy, or if the law prevents them from obtaining one.
The current state of the law does not favor victims of supervisory
harassment who bring workplace harassment claims against their employers.
If a plaintiﬀ-employee brings such a claim, the plaintiﬀ ’s employer can raise
a defense known as the Faragher-Ellerth defense. When applying the defense,
the court examines whether the employer was reasonable in seeking to
prevent and correct any instances of harassment, and whether the employee
was reasonable in taking advantage of the preventative or corrective measures
oﬀered.16 Problematically, federal courts have inconsistently applied both
elements of the defense, which has raised serious impediments to plaintiﬀs’
workplace harassment claims. With respect to the ﬁrst element of the defense,
the Fourth Circuit, for example, has placed the burden on the plaintiﬀ to
rebut evidence that the defendant-employer was successful in preventing the
harassment, and other jurisdictions have disregarded the necessity to ﬁnd the
defendant-employer acted to provide corrective measures to instances of
harassment.17 The inconsistent applications of the defense is a signiﬁcant
impediment to plaintiﬀs because they infringe upon both the predictability
of their claims and the goal of deterring workplace harassment.
With regard to the second element of the defense, some circuit courts
have held that there is no need to consider this element in cases where an
employee reports a single, severe instance of harassment, which further
14 See, e.g., Cara Kelly & Aaron Hegarty, #MeToo Was a Culture Shock. But Changing Laws Will
Take More Than a Year, USA TODAY (October 4, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news
/investigations/2018/10/04/metoo-me-too-sexual-assault-survivors-rights-bill/1074976002/
[https://perma.cc/QV3A-9BN9]. A study conducted by USA Today found “since #MeToo began,
elected oﬃcials passed 261 [state] laws that directly addressed topics championed by the movement,
just a slight uptick from the 238 in the year prior.” Id. However, few of those laws “substantially
remove the barriers for victims to report and seek justice,” and no new congressional laws have
passed. Id. Congress is currently considering the EMPOWER Act, which was introduced during
the 2018 Congressional session. Id. The Act will seek to restrict non-disclosure agreements related
to sexual harassment in the workplace and create a “tip line” run by the Equal Opportunity
Employment Commission. Id. Currently, the bill has been referred to the Subcommittee on the
Constitutional, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties. H.R. 1521-EMPOWER Act, CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/1521/all-actions?r=97&overview
=closed#tabs [https://perma.cc/R7FA-JM9L].
15 In 2017, 6,697 charges were ﬁled with the EEOC, while in 2018, 7,609 were ﬁled. Charges
Alleging Sex-Based Harassment, supra note 6.
16 See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (defining the two necessary
elements of an affirmative defense an employer can raise when “subject to vicarious liability to a
victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor”).
17 See infra Section II.A.
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contributes to the inconsistency in which it has applied.18 Additionally,
courts will frequently find that it is unreasonable as a matter of law if a
woman waits or fails to report allegations of supervisory harassment to her
employer and will grant summary judgment in favor of the defendantemployer.19 Courts will find plaintiffs’ delays in reporting to be unreasonable
even if the plaintiff appears to have a justifiable reason for delaying to report
her allegations of harassment.20 This is problematic as courts fail to consider
the psychological impact harassment can have on a woman. Studies have
reported on the psychological trauma and physical manifestations of this
trauma victims of harassment may suffer, which can influence a woman’s
choice to delay or refrain from reporting.21 In the case of Robyn McEuen,
because McEuen’s claims went unreported for approximately two and a half
months, a case brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
against McEuen’s employer failed.22
Federal courts’ application of this defense impedes victims from
vindicating their rights and fails to give credence to their claims. For these
reasons, courts should adopt a modiﬁed approach that allows for both a more
consistent application of the Faragher-Ellerth defense and permits courts to
consider victims’ responses to instances of harassment. With respect to the
ﬁrst element of the defense, this approach should encourage consideration of
whether the defendant-employer implemented an equitable anti-harassment
policy and whether the employer responded reasonably in providing
corrective measures for alleged instances of harassment. With respect to the
second element of the defense, this approach should encourage consideration
of the employee’s rationale for waiting to report an instance of harassment.
Courts should refrain from determining the reasonableness of both elements
of the defense as a matter of law, as material facts often exist with respect to
each element.
One such approach has been adopted by the Third Circuit in a decision
published in July of 2018, Minarsky v. Susquehanna County.23 This decision
held that reasonableness is “the cornerstone of this analysis” and that it is
best left for the jury to decide.24 This decision has recently received some
attention, with scholarship noting that Minarsky “is more consistent with the
language of Faragher and Ellerth opinions, as well as the policy underlying

18
19
20
21
22
23
24

See infra Section II.B.
See infra subsection II.C.1.
See infra subsection II.C.2–3.
See infra subsection II.C.4.
Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. AutoZone Inc., 692 F. App’x 280, 286 (6th Cir. 2017).
895 F.3d 303, 314 (3d Cir. 2018).
Id. at 311.

1066

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 168: 1061

Title VII.”25 Significantly, no other federal circuit court has adopted a similar
standard of reasonableness to apply to this defense.
This Comment will focus on why a new approach is needed to the
Faragher-Ellerth defense. I will detail how federal courts have applied
incongruous and disjointed reasoning when addressing hostile work
environment claims with respect to both elements of the defense, and how
courts have failed to consider the psychological impact that instances of
harassment can have on victims that may contribute to their reluctance or
failure to report claims of harassment to their employer. I will argue that in
light of the #MeToo movement, this problematic application poses a serious
impediment to plaintiﬀ-employees seeking to vindicate their rights in
bringing these claims. Overall, I will contend that it is necessary for courts to
reconsider this standard and apply an approach, like the approach articulated
by the Third Circuit, that emphasizes the reasonableness of both parties.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF TITLE VII AND SUPERVISORY HARASSMENT
CLAIMS
Workplace harassment claims were not always actionable. Section 703 of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made it an “unlawful employment
practice” for an employer to “discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” or to
“tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely aﬀect his status as an employee” on the basis of sex.26 However, it
was not until 1986 that the Supreme Court aﬃrmatively acknowledged that a
cause of action existed to redress instances of harassment an employee
experienced in the workplace as a result of their supervisor’s conduct.27 In
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the Supreme Court held that “a plaintiﬀ may
establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex
has created a hostile or abusive work environment.”28 This groundbreaking
25 Matthew D. Venuti, Modernizing the Workplace: The Third Circuit Puts the Faragher-Ellerth
Aﬃrmative Defense in Context, 64 VILL. L. REV. 535, 538 (2019).
26 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2) (2018). It is also unlawful for an employer to take such actions
against an employee on the basis of the employee’s race, color, religion or national origin. Id.
27 A claim of hostile work environment by an employee’s co-worker is held to a diﬀerent
standard: “[I]f the harassing employee is a co-worker, a negligence standard applies. To satisfy that
standard, the complainant must show that the employer knew or should have known of the oﬀensive
conduct but failed to take appropriate corrective action.” Vance v. Ball St. Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 45354 (2013). This Comment addresses claims of harassment against an employee’s supervisor only.
28 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986). In this case, Mechelle Vinson brought an action against her former
employer, Meritor Savings Bank, and her supervisor, Sidney Taylor, alleging that during her four
years working at the bank, she was subjected to sexual harassment by Taylor. Id. at 59-60. Vinson
alleged that after she was trained as a teller at the bank in 1974, Taylor invited her to dinner and
“suggested that they go to a motel to have sexual relations.” Id. at 60. Vinson alleged she feared
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case marked the ﬁrst time that the Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged
that victims of harassment in the workplace can have a remedy in court.29
The Court held that hostile work environment claims can arise in the
presence of a tangible employment action,30 which includes decisions that
“[a]ﬀect a signiﬁcant change in employment status, such as hiring, ﬁring,
failing to promote, reassignment with signiﬁcantly diﬀerent responsibilities,
or a decision causing a signiﬁcant change in beneﬁts.”31 However, a hostile
work environment claim can also be actionable in the absence of a tangible
employment action.32 Further, the Court in Meritor explained that for such a
claim to be actionable, it must be “suﬃciently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working
environment.”33 Later, the Court in Harris v. Forklift held that “severe or
pervasive” is held to both a subjective and objective standard—conduct must
have “create[d] an objectively hostile or abusive work environment—an
environment that a reasonable person would ﬁnd hostile or abusive” and the
victim must have subjectively perceived the environment to be abusive as well.34
losing her job and thus agreed to Taylor’s request. Id. Vinson alleged that Taylor subsequently
repeatedly demanded that Vinson perform sexual acts on him and that out of fear, Vinson agreed.
Id. Vinson alleged that Taylor touched her inappropriately, exposed himself to her, followed her into
the restroom, and that Taylor raped her several times. Id. The case went to trial, and Vinson testiﬁed
that due to her fear of Taylor “she never reported his harassment to any of his supervisors and never
attempted to use the bank’s complaint procedure.” Id. at 61. The district court held that Vinson was
not the victim of sexual harassment during the course of her employment, reasoning that any sexual
relationship between Vinson and her supervisor was voluntary because it was unrelated to her
employment or advancement; thus, there was no quid pro quo. Id. The District of Columbia Court
of Appeals reversed and held that “a violation of Title VII may be predicated on . . . harassment that
. . . creates a hostile or oﬀensive working environment.” Id. at 62. The Supreme Court aﬃrmed this
interpretation of Title VII and held that “[t]he correct inquiry is whether respondent by her conduct
indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome, not whether her actual participation in
sexual intercourse was voluntary.” Id. at 68. The Court held that harassment may be predicated on
either “harassment that involves the conditioning of concrete employment beneﬁts on sexual favors,
and harassment that, while not aﬀecting economic beneﬁts, creates a hostile or oﬀensive working
environment.” Id. at 62. Harassment that involves conditioning employment beneﬁts or favors is
known as quid pro quo and entails “[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.” Id. at 65 (citing 29 C.F.R § 1604.11(a) (1985)).
The focus of this Comment will be on claims of hostile work environment that do not affect
economic benefits, or non-quid pro quo claims.
29 See Robert R. Graham, Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Right: The Need to Revisit the
Ellerth/Faragher Aﬃrmative Defense, 30 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 423, 426 (2016)
(citing Meritor as the ﬁrst speciﬁc recognition of two kinds of actionable harassment claims: quid
pro quo and hostile environment).
30 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.
31 Vance, 570 U.S. at 431 (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)).
32 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
33 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
34 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). The Court explained that the “severe or pervasive” standard “takes a
middle path between making actionable any conduct that is merely oﬀensive and requiring the
conduct to cause a tangible psychological injury.” Id. These eﬀects do not have to be tangible in
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In Meritor, the Court did not explicitly hold that an employer can be
vicariously liable for the harassing conduct of a supervisor that gives rise to a
claim of hostile work environment and declined to opine on “a deﬁnitive rule
on employer liability” regarding the standard of vicarious liability in that
context.35 However, in 1998, the Supreme Court did hold that an employer
can be vicariously liable for the actions of a supervisor who has subjected an
employee to harassing conduct that is severe or pervasive.36 The Court sought
to square this imposition of vicarious liability by preventing an employer
from becoming “‘automatically’ liable for harassment by a supervisor who
creates the requisite degree of discrimination.”37 In diﬀerentiating a claim of
supervisory harassment from the standard surrounding traditional agency
liability, the Court held that “[w]hen no tangible employment action is taken,
a defending employer may raise an aﬃrmative defense to liability or damages,
subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence.”38 The Supreme Court
in 2013 clariﬁed the deﬁnition of supervisor by holding that a supervisor is
one who can “cause ‘direct economic harm’ by taking a tangible employment
action” against an employee.39 Thus, the defense can only be applied in hostile
work environment claims where the allegation is that a supervisor did not take
a tangible action against the plaintiﬀ-employee.
This aﬃrmative defense requires that a defendant-employer prove two
elements by a preponderance of the evidence; the ﬁrst requires “that the
employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any
sexually harassing behavior” and the second requires “that the plaintiﬀ
nature; the Court noted that “the very fact that discriminatory conduct was so severe or pervasive
that it created a work environment abusive to employees because of their race, gender, religion, or
national origin oﬀends Title VII’s broad rule of workplace equality.” Id. at 22. The Court made clear
that a “discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one that does not seriously aﬀect
employees’ psychological well-being, can and often will detract from employees’ job performance,
discourage employees from remaining on the job, or keep them from advancing in their careers” and
that “no single factor is required” in determining whether an environment is suﬃciently severe or
pervasive. Id. at 22-23.
35 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
36 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
37 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 804 (1998). The Court has also noted that
although employers can be held vicariously liable for intentional torts that their employees commit
within the scope of their employment, “[t]he general rule is that sexual harassment by a supervisor
is not conduct within the scope of employment.” Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 757.
38 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. The exact language detailing the elements needed to establish a
hostile work environment claim against one’s supervisor varies slightly between circuit courts.
Generally, to meet a prima facie case, an employee must show that he or she suffered discrimination
because her or she is a member of a protected class, that it was severe or pervasive, and that respondeat
superior liability exists. See, e.g., Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2013).
39 Vance v. Ball St. Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 440 (2013); see also Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S.
129, 134 (2004) (clarifying that if an employee is constructively discharged, in that the employee
feels forced to resign due to an abusive working environment, this does not count as a tangible
employment action and the defense can be applied).
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employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm
otherwise.”40 If a plaintiﬀ alleges that a supervisor committed harassment in
the absence of a tangible employment action, the employer must demonstrate
both of these elements to assert the aﬃrmative defense.41 This has come to
be known as the Faragher-Ellerth aﬃrmative defense after the name of two
Supreme Court decisions released on the same day in 1998, Burlington
Industries v. Ellerth42 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.43
This defense has frequently been raised,44 as it allows courts to grant
summary judgment in favor of the defendant-employer when both prongs are
met. The defense sought to achieve the goals of avoiding harm and
encouraging victims of harassment to come forward and report their
allegations of harassment.45 In practice, however, federal courts’ interpretation
and application of the defense has become an unjustified hurdle for plaintiffs
and, in many instances, both elements of the defense are easily met even in
circumstances of egregious harassment.46 If the Faragher-Ellerth defense had
been applied to the facts of Meritor, it is unlikely that a lower court would have
found that the defendant-employer was liable and would have granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendant because the plaintiff never
reported the harassment to her employer.47 Since the establishment of the
defense, federal courts have been otherwise unsympathetic to plaintiffs, many
of whom suffer in silence. Such treatment by federal courts is intolerable and
a new approach to the defense must be recognized.

Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
Id.
524 U.S. 742 (1998).
524 U.S. 775 (1998).
A search on Westlaw reveals that in the past three years alone the defense has been cited
nearly 300 times.
45 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806; see also L. Camille Hebert, Why Don’t Reasonable Women Complain
about Sexual Harassment?, 82 IND. L.J. 711, 715 (2007) (“The Court noted that the aﬃrmative defense
was intended to support Title VII’s ‘policies of encouraging forethought by employers and saving
action by objecting employees.’” (citation omitted)).
46 See, e.g., Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Serv., Inc., 347 F.3d 1272, 1276-77, 1293 (11th Cir.
2003) (granting summary judgment for the defendant-employer that invoked the aﬃrmative defense
in a case in which the plaintiﬀ ’s supervisor repeatedly raped her).
47 See supra note 28 and related explanation of factual circumstances of Meritor. The plaintiﬀ
did not report the years of harassment she experienced because she feared her supervisor. Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 61 (1986).
40
41
42
43
44
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II. FARAGHER-ELLERTH IN PRACTICE: THE PROBLEMATIC
APPLICATION TO SUPERVISORY HARASSMENT CLAIMS
Federal courts’ application of the Faragher-Ellerth defense is problematic
for several reasons. Primarily, federal courts have adopted inconsistent
standards when applying both the ﬁrst and second elements of the defense;
thus, an employee-victim’s case is inﬂuenced by the jurisdiction in which the
case is brought.48 In rendering these decisions, federal courts are quick to
allow employers to escape liability at the summary judgment stage, despite
the existence of questions of material facts. Through this defense, federal
courts have applied the law in such cases “in ways quite hostile to the interests
of women who have been sexually harassed and quite favorable to the interests
of employers whose supervisory employees have been accused of sexual
harassment.”49 They have failed to give due deference to victims’ concerns
and reasons for waiting to report harassment.50 Such applications of this
defense have resulted in serious impediments for plaintiﬀ-employees in
bringing their claims and, in the interest of justice, should be reevaluated.
A. Inconsistent Applications of the First Prong of the Aﬃrmative Defense
As noted, federal courts have inconsistently applied the ﬁrst element of
the aﬃrmative defense to cases of supervisory harassment, which requires
“that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly
any sexually harassing behavior.”51 In both Faragher and Ellerth, the Supreme
Court did not explicitly outline the approach federal courts should take in
addressing this ﬁrst prong, but did oﬀer that “the need for a stated policy
suitable to the employment circumstances may appropriately be addressed in
any case when litigating the ﬁrst element of the defense.”52
Based on the Supreme Court’s language, most federal courts have
recognized that the ﬁrst prong includes two subcomponents: the employer
must take measures to both prevent harassment and to correct instances of
harassment that the employer becomes aware of.53 However, federal courts
See infra Sections II.A–B.
Hebert, supra note 45, at 715.
See infra Section II.C.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
Id.; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 778.
See, e.g., Weger v. City of Ladue, 500 F.3d 710, 719 (8th Cir. 2007) (noting that “[t]he first
element of the affirmative defense imposes two requirements on employers, they must have (1)
exercised reasonable care to prevent sexual harassment (the ‘prevention prong’) and (2) promptly
corrected any sexual harassment that did occur (the ‘correction prong’)”); see also, Shaw v.
AutoZone, Inc., 180 F.3d 806, 812 (7th Cir. 1999) (“The first prong of the Ellerth affirmative
defense also requires [the employer-defendant] to prove that it exercised reasonable care to
respond to the sexual harassment.”).
48
49
50
51
52
53
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have taken diﬀerent approaches regarding what they view as necessary to
satisfy the ﬁrst prong of this element: the “prevention prong.”54 With regard
to this prong, most courts have provided that evidence of implementation and
dissemination of an anti-harassment policy can aid defendant-employers in
satisfying this component.55 The Tenth Circuit has even found that evidence
of implementation and dissemination of an anti-harassment policy is enough
for the court to ﬁnd that the employer satisﬁed the prevention prong as a
matter of law, even if the employer “provided no [anti-]harassment training
or provided training only to managers.”56 This application of the prevention
prong is problematic because it does not help to encourage employers to
implement deterrent measures, such as training programs, that can be
enforced with the goal of preventing harassment in the workplace.
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit has applied an approach that diﬀers from
other courts’ by providing a presumption that the “dissemination of ‘an
eﬀective anti-harassment policy provides compelling proof ’ that an employer
has exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct sexual harassment.”57
Plaintiﬀ-employees can only rebut this presumption by providing evidence
that the “employer adopted or administered an anti-harassment policy in bad
faith or that the policy was otherwise defective or dysfunctional.”58
The Fourth Circuit is the only federal circuit that has implemented this
approach that provides a presumption that the defendant-employer has
satisﬁed the prevention prong. However, district courts in other jurisdictions
have applied this logic.59 This approach creates an additional hurdle for
54 Though some attention has been brought to a circuit split regarding whether the
application of the second prong of the defense is necessary, see infra Section II.B, little attention
has been brought to the different standards that federal courts have applied in evaluating the first
prong of the defense.
55 See Matvia v. Bald Head Island Mgmt., Inc., 259 F.3d 261, 268 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing
Lissau v. S. Food Servs., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 182 (4th Cir. 1998)) (noting
“that dissemination of ‘an effective anti-harassment policy provides compelling proof ’ that an
employer has exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct sexual harassment”); see also Reed
v. MBNA Mktg. Sys. Inc., 333 F.3d 27, 34 (1st Cir. 2003) (examining whether “reasonable
precautions to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior by its employees” were
taken by the defendant-employer); Macks v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 128 (2d Cir. 2003)
(“One way for employers to demonstrate that they exercised reasonable care is to show that they
had an anti-harassment policy in place.”); Shaw, 180 F.3d at 811 (noting that adopting and
distributing a policy is suﬃcient).
56 Stapp v. Curry Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 672 F. App’x 841, 849 (10th Cir. 2016) (citing
Debord v. Mercy Health Sys. of Kan., Inc., 737 F.3d 642, 653 (10th Cir. 2013)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
57 Matvia, 259 F.3d at 268 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing Lissau, 159 F.3d at 182); see also McKinnish v.
Brennan, 630 F. App’x 177, 183 (4th Cir. 2015) (noting the same).
58 Walton v. N.C. Dep’t of Agr. & Consumer Servs., 494 F. App’x 300, 302 (4th Cir. 2012)
(citing Barret v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262, 266 (4th Cir. 2001)).
59 See O’Dell v. Trans World Entm’t Corp., 153 F. Supp. 2d 378, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (explaining
that if a defendant-employer provides evidence of a harassment policy to satisfy the ﬁrst element of
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plaintiﬀ-employees to overcome, as this rebuttable presumption makes it
easier for defendant-employers to meet the ﬁrst element of this defense. For
example, in McKinney v. G4S Government Solutions, Inc., the Western District
of Virginia held that the plaintiﬀ-employee “trie[d] to overcome this [burden]
. . . by relying on his own testimony that there was little training on the
[employer’s] policy, and no retraining, although the employees were asked to
sign forms saying that they had been retrained” and that a supervisor
threatened employees to not make anti-harassment complaints.60 However,
the court still found that there was “simply insufficient evidence in the
record from which a reasonable jury could find the policy was dysfunctional
or adopted in bad faith.”61
With regard to the second prong of the defense’s ﬁrst element, the
“correction prong,” federal courts have traditionally separated the analysis of
whether the employer had taken reasonable correction measures from
whether the employee had reported the instances of harassment to the
employer.62 The Seventh Circuit has a comparatively high standard for
employers to meet the correction prong, requiring that the corrective
measures employers take “must be reasonably calculated to prevent further
harassment under the particular facts and circumstances of the case at the
time the allegations are made.”63
In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit has taken a diﬀerent approach with
respect to the correction prong by allowing the defense to circumvent its
application in certain instances. The Eleventh Circuit has provided that “once
an employer has promulgated an eﬀective anti-harassment policy and
disseminated that policy and associated procedures to its employees, then it
is incumbent upon the employees to utilize the procedural mechanisms
established by the company speciﬁcally to address problems and

the defense, “[t]he employee may then rebut the employer’s proof by showing that the sexual
harassment policy is not eﬀective, which can be demonstrated . . . by evidence that the employer did
not disseminate its policy to its employees.”); see also Hunt v. Wal-Mart, 931 F.3d 624, 630 (7th Cir.
2019) (“An employer’s adoption of an eﬀective anti-harassment policy is an important factor in
determining whether it exercised reasonable care to prevent sexual harassment.”); Aiello v. Stamford
Hosp., No. 09-1161, 2011 WL 3439459, at *26 (D. Conn. Aug. 8, 2011) (ﬁnding that the defendant
satisﬁed the ﬁrst element of the defense because the defendant provided suﬃcient evidence that
they had a harassment policy in place and the plaintiﬀ failed to rebut this).
60 179 F. Supp. 3d 609, 623 (W.D. Va. 2016).
61 Id.
62 See E.E.O.C. v. Cromer Food Servs. Inc., 414 F. App’x 602, 607 (4th Cir. 2011) (explicitly
rejecting the approach of the Eleventh Circuit, explaining that “the Eleventh Circuit held that an
employee who had not followed the anti-harassment policy had not effectively put the company on
notice. This is not the approach taken by the Fourth Circuit”) (internal citation omitted).
63 Cerros v. Steel Tech., Inc., 398 F.3d 944, 953 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing McKenzie v. Ill. Dep’t
of Transp., 92 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir. 1996)).
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grievances.”64 Once the policy has been distributed, the Eleventh Circuit
seemingly allows courts to jump directly to the second element of the
aﬃrmative defense that analyzes whether the employee has “tak[en]
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer.”65 For example, in Scott v. Publix Supermarkets, the plaintiﬀ alleged
that her supervisor ordered the plaintiﬀ to give him back rubs, asked the
plaintiﬀ “what she would do if he kissed her and what she would do if he
walked her to her car, pressed her against it, and kissed her” and would “call
across the parking lot for her to lift up her shirt,” among other conduct.66 The
Southern District of Florida, relying on the Eleventh Circuit’s approach,
found it unnecessary to analyze the correction prong because the plaintiﬀ did
not report the harassment to the store managers.67 The court jumped to its
analysis of the second element of the aﬃrmative defense as a result.68
Permitting courts to skip their analysis of the correction prong creates
another safeguard for the defense that defendant-employers can use to meet
the preponderance standard. This exempliﬁes how a plaintiﬀ-employee may
be more likely to face a grant of summary judgment if she ﬁles her claim in
the Eleventh Circuit as opposed to elsewhere.
Furthermore, in considering the ﬁrst element in its entirety, some courts
have found that it is not necessary for both the prevention and correction
methods the employer has implemented to be successful to satisfy the ﬁrst
element. Speciﬁcally, some courts have held that merely an attempt by the
employer to address the problem is suﬃcient. For example, the Second
Circuit has held that “[a]n employer need not prove success in preventing
harassing behavior in order to demonstrate that it exercised reasonable care
in preventing and correcting sexually harassing conduct.”69 This does not
serve to deter harassment or encourage employers to take ﬁrm measures to
prevent harassment in the workplace but merely provides them with a safety
valve to escape liability in an instance in which an employee has been the

64 Cooper v. CLP Corp., 679 F. App’x 851, 855 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing Madray v. Publix
Supermarkets, Inc., 208 F.3d 1290, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000)); see also Jones v. Allstate Ins. Co., 707 F. App’x
641, 649 (11th Cir. 2017) (noting the same, though briefly describing a corrective measure the defendantemployer took); Nichols v. Volunteers of Am., N. Ala., Inc., No. 08-S-501, 2013 WL 1767803, at *3 (N.D.
Ala. Apr. 24, 2013) (finding that the “defendant exercised reasonable care in preventing harassment
based upon the existence, content, and dissemination of its anti-harassment policy”).
65 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
66 No. 07-60624, 2008 WL 2940672, at *1-2 (S.D. Fla. July 28, 2008).
67 Id. at *7.
68 Id. at *7-8.
69 Leopold v. Baccarat, Inc., 239 F.3d 243, 245 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Caridad v. Metro-North
Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 295 (2d Cir. 1999)) (emphasis added); see Steﬀy v. Ford Motor Co.,
No. 04-319S, 2007 WL 895506, at *15 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2007) (noting this and ﬁnding that
existence of a policy was suﬃcient to satisfy the ﬁrst element of the defense).
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victim of appalling behavior. This is again representative of the inconsistent
manner in which circuit courts have applied the ﬁrst element of the defense.
B. Inconsistent Application of the Second Element of the Aﬃrmative Defense
Several federal circuit courts have found it unnecessary to examine the
second element of the aﬃrmative defense in certain instances, providing
further evidence of how federal courts have incongruously applied this
defense. Scholarship has detailed this circuit split, noting that some “courts
hold that employers must prove only the ﬁrst [element] of the defense in
order to prevail when there has been a single, severe incident of harassment”
while others apply the whole defense in all instances.70
To contextualize this circuit split, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits have
dropped the ﬁrst element in cases of “rapid-onset harassment” in which there
was a single, typically severe, instance of harassment, rather than a case in
which there are repeated instances of harassment by a supervisor.71 For
example, in Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., the plaintiﬀ-employee alleged
that while she was attending a work convention over a four-day period, her
supervisor made a series of “crude sexual comments and sexual gestures” to
her, and the plaintiﬀ reported the incidents to her manager and human
resources director upon returning.72 The company issued a warning to the
plaintiﬀ ’s supervisor and suspended the supervisor for seven days without
pay.73 The plaintiﬀ subsequently brought a hostile work environment claim
against her employer, and the employer raised the aﬃrmative Faragher-Ellerth
defense.74 The Fifth Circuit granted summary judgment ﬁnding that the
defendant-employer satisﬁed the ﬁrst element of the aﬃrmative defense,
holding that “a case presenting only an incipient hostile environment
corrected by prompt remedial action should be distinct from a case in which
70 Natalie S. Neals, Comment, Flirting with the Law: An Analysis of the Ellerth/Faragher Circuit
Split and a Prediction of the Seventh Circuit’s Stance, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 167, 171 (2013); see also id. at 18486; Charles W. Garrison, Once Is Enough: The Need to Apply the Full Ellerth/Faragher Affirmative
Defense in Single Incident and Incipient Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment Claims, 61 CATH.
U. L. REV. 1131, 1145 (2012); Graham, supra note 29, at 430-34; John H. Marks, Smoke, Mirrors, and the
Disappearance of Vicarious Liability: The Emergency of a Dubious Summary-Judgment Safe Harbor for
Employers Whose Supervisory Personnel Commit Hostile Environment Workplace Harassment, 38 HOUS. L.
REV. 1401, 1439 (2002).
71 See McCurdy v. Ark. State Police, 375 F.3d 762, 774 (8th Cir. 2004); Indest v. Freeman
Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 260 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Neals, supra note 70, at 182-83.
72 Indest, 164 F.3d at 260.
73 Id. at 261. After learning of Indest’s intent to ﬁle charges with the EEOC, the company
issued a written statement that conﬁrmed the actions the company took and wrote to the supervisor
that “[the company is] particularly concerned that there never [was] any discriminatory action taken
against Connie Indest in retaliation [for] her complaint. It is vitally important that there be no
future instances of sexual harassment of our employees by you.” Id.
74 Id.
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a company was never called upon to react to a supervisor’s protracted or
extremely severe acts that created a hostile environment.”75
Other courts have explicitly rejected this approach. For example, in
Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., the Tenth Circuit held that “the reasoning of
Indest is highly suspect and, in our view, should not be adopted” as “there is
no reason to believe that the ‘remarkably straightforward’ framework outlined
in Faragher and Burlington does not control all cases in which a plaintiﬀ
employee seeks to hold his or her employer vicariously liable for a supervisor’s
sexual harassment.”76
This circuit split is representative of another way in which the aﬃrmative
defense has been inconsistently applied across circuits. Circuit courts’ refusal
to apply the defense in instances of single cases of harassment is problematic
as it allows an employer to avoid liability in a potentially egregious, albeit
standalone, instance of harassment. Scholars have noted that in courts’ refusal
to apply the full defense, “an employer who exercises reasonable care in
responding to a complaint of sexual harassment will be able to prevail on the
aﬃrmative defense and avoid liability even if the conduct was severe or
pervasive.”77 A plaintiﬀ ’s claim should not fail simply because harassment
occurred during only one instance.78 In standard cases of vicarious liability,
75 Id. at 265, 267. Similarly, in McCurdy v. Ark. State Police, the Eighth Circuit also declined to
apply the second element of the defense cases of rapid-onset harassment. 375 F.3d 762, 772 (8th Cir.
2004). In this case, the plaintiﬀ worked as a radio dispatcher; one evening, her supervisor came in
and “cupped, touched, [and] brushed against” her left breast, and told her that if he were in charge
“[her] uniform would be panties and a tank top,” among other comments. Id. at 764. The plaintiﬀ
reported the behavior, and the plaintiﬀ ’s employer conducted an investigation and terminated the
supervisor’s employment over two months later; however, the supervisor’s employment was
subsequently reinstated and he was transferred to a diﬀerent unit. Id. at 766-67. The employer
invoked the aﬃrmative defense, and the Eighth Circuit held that because the defendant-employer
promptly responded to the allegation, it would be inappropriate to follow the Faragher-Ellerth
defense as outlined by the Supreme Court, and that the reviewing employer’s response alone (the
ﬁrst element of the defense) was suﬃcient to grant summary judgment. Id. at 774.
76 248 F.3d 1014, 1026 (10th Cir. 2001); see also Alade v. AWS Assistance Corp., 796 F. Supp.
2d 936, 946 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (also upholding both elements of the defense). The EEOC appears to
support this position as well. See Enforcement Guidance on Vicarious Employer Liability for
Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.html [https://perma.cc/MC7Q-P3C5] (noting that
“[t]he employer will be shielded from liability for harassment by a supervisor only if it proves that
it exercised reasonable care in preventing and correcting the harassment and that the employee
unreasonably failed to avoid all of the harm”); Neals, supra note 70, at 190 (explaining that the EEOC
endorses application of both elements in all circumstances).
77 David Sherwyn et al., Don’t Train Your Employees and Cancel Your ‘1-800’ Harassment Hotline:
An Empirical Examination and Correction of the Flaws in the Aﬃrmative Defense to Sexual Harassment
Charges, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1295-96 (2001).
78 As has been noted, “[i]n gradual-onset cases, a judge should rarely be able to decide, as a
matter of law, that the reasonable person, given all the circumstances, necessarily would have
regarded the abuse threshold as crossed with the supervisor’s ﬁrst antic, or the second one, or the
third one, and so on.” Marks, supra note 70, at 1449.
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even if the supervisor committed an intentional tort in a single instance, the
employer can be held liable.79 Holding otherwise cuts against the aim to deter
workplace harassment, and such an approach should not be condoned.
C. The Unreasonable Application of the Second Element
Federal courts frequently hold that if a plaintiﬀ-employee waits, or
declines to, report an instance of harassment to her employer, the plaintiﬀ is
unreasonable as a matter of law under the second element of the defense.
However, the aﬃrmative defense does not provide that an employee must
report an allegation of harassment within a speciﬁc timeframe, which has left
plaintiﬀs with an unclear standard as to what amounts to an unreasonable
delay in reporting. Further, courts have held that the employees are
unreasonable by failing to follow the precise reporting procedures in their
employee policies and have failed to consider that plaintiﬀs may have a
justiﬁable reason for waiting to report. In coming to these decisions, courts
do not consider the psychological trauma incidents of harassment can have
on a victim which may contribute to a plaintiﬀ ’s reason for delaying to report
an allegation of harassment. This further represents why a new standard is
needed when examining these claims.
1. Courts Find That Delays in Reporting Are Unreasonable
as a Matter of Law
As noted, the second element of the aﬃrmative defense requires the court
to consider how reasonable a plaintiﬀ-employee was in taking advantage of
the preventative opportunities the employer oﬀers. Though the defense was
aimed at preventing harm and deterring sexual harassment, many courts have
held that employee-plaintiﬀs’ delays in reporting instances of harassment to
their employers are unreasonable as a matter of law.80 Scholars have noted
that “[a]s a general matter, courts have strictly enforced the victim’s duty to
complain.”81 In many instances, federal courts have held that the plaintiﬀ-

79 See, e.g., Spurlock v. Townes, 661 F. App’x 536, 540 (10th Cir. 2016) (holding that “an
employer may be held liable for the intentional torts of an employee—even if the employee was
acting outside the scope of his or her employment—if the employee ‘was aided in accomplishing the
tort by the existence of the agency relation’”).
80 See Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form over Substance
in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 21 (2003) (“Cases analyzing this prong of the
aﬃrmative defense have focused on whether the victim made correct use of the grievance
procedures, how long the victim waited to complain, and whether a victim who failed to complain
had any justiﬁcation for her silence.”).
81 Id.; see also Venuti, supra note 25, at 551 (explaining that “an employer can usually establish
the second prong if it can show that the employee delayed acting upon an anti-harassment policy”).
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employee was unreasonable for waiting a few weeks or a few months to report
an instance of harassment.82
For example, in July of 2019, the Seventh Circuit found that a plaintiﬀemployee was unreasonable as a matter of law for waiting for months to report
an instance of harassment.83 In Hunt v. Wal-Mart Stores, the plaintiﬀemployee, Tristana Hunt, alleged that her supervisor sexually harassed her on
a daily basis for over ﬁve months.84 Hunt’s supervisor, Daniel Watson,
frequently asked to see her breasts, telling “her he wanted to shower with her
and feel her breasts.”85 After four months of experiencing frequent
harassment, Hunt reported Watson’s conduct to the store manager. The
manager “concluded [that] Hunt’s claims could not be substantiated without
corroborating witnesses” and merely required Hunt’s supervisor to retake an
ethics course even though another employee had previously made a similar
complaint against Watson.86 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that “employees
have a duty to utilize reporting mechanisms provided by their employer, or
otherwise alert their employer of the problem,” and found that because Hunt
failed to take advantage of Wal-Mart’s reporting systems for four months, she
acted unreasonably.87 Courts have frequently held that delays are
unreasonable as a matter of law without considering the toll harassment can
take on plaintiﬀ-employees and giving credence to the reasons they may
hesitate to report.88 Further, such decisions to hold such delays unreasonable
82 A study conducted in 2001 that reviewed the ﬁrst seventy-two published decisions that
invoked the Faragher-Ellerth defense found that in a dozen of those cases “courts found plaintiﬀs to
have acted unreasonably because they delayed reporting the harassment. In some cases, there was a
delay of one year or more between the ﬁrst harassing actions and the report. In other cases, however,
the delay was a matter of months or even weeks.” Sherwyn et al., supra note 77, at 1297.
83 Hunt v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 931 F.3d 624, 631 (7th Cir. 2019).
84 Id. at 627.
85 Id. at 626.
86 Id. at 626-27.
87 Id. at 631. Similarly, in Williams v. United Launch Alliance, the plaintiﬀ alleged that her
supervisor made frequent sexual comments and facial gestures towards her; at one point, her
supervisor “approached [her] from behind as she returned to her workstation . . . and informed her
that he was doing a ‘butt block’ . . . so nobody else could see it. 286 F. Supp. 3d 1293, 1299 (N.D.
Ala. 2018). At another point, he told her that employees in another department would want to see
her “down on all fours,” and he frequently made other similarly lewd comments. Id. at 1300. The
court held that because the plaintiﬀ did not strictly comply with the employer’s policy that detailed
employees should promptly report harassment “preferably within three business days of the
conduct,” and because the employee waited sixteen months since the harassment began, and four
months after the employee experienced the most recent incident of harassment, the delay was
unreasonable as a matter of law. Id. at 1309-10. Ultimately, the court granted summary judgment in
favor of the defendant-employer. Id. at 1311.
88 See, e.g., Mackenzie v. Potter, 219 F. App’x 500, 504-05 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding a seven
month delay unreasonable as a matter of law); see also Christian v. AHS Tulsa Reg’l Med., LLC, 430
F. App’x 694, 700 (10th Cir. 2011) (ﬁnding that waiting until October to report incidents of
harassment that occurred between January and May was unreasonable); Pinkerton v. Colo. Dep’t of
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as a matter of law have been criticized as “typically treat[ing] these
purportedly unreasonable delays as something akin to contributory
negligence—a complete bar to recovery.”89
However, some lower courts have found delays within similar timeframes
to be reasonable. For example, in Chin-McKenzie v. Continuum Health
Partners, the Southern District of New York declined to grant summary
judgment even though the plaintiﬀ-employee waited ﬁve months to report
her allegations of harassment.90 These inconsistent standards are problematic
since the Supreme Court has never provided a bright-line rule as to what is
considered a justiﬁable delay in reporting. This makes it diﬃcult for plaintiﬀs
to predict what courts will deem to be a reasonable response.91
Furthermore, in instances where plaintiffs report but fail to comply with
the specifics of their employer’s reporting procedure, or when plaintiffs provide
a justification for waiting to report, courts are still hesitant to find that this
validates plaintiffs’ claims. As will be explained, in these instances, courts may
still grant summary judgment in favor of the defendant-employer even when
the plaintiff’s rationale seems reasonable.
2. Dismissal of Complaints if Plaintiﬀ-Employees Do Not Strictly Adhere
to Employer’s Reporting Procedure
Courts, particularly in the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits, have
frequently found that plaintiffs’ delays in reporting were unreasonable as a
matter of law because they did not follow the exact procedure specified in
the defendant-employer’s anti-harassment policy.92 The Eleventh Circuit
Transp., 563 F.3d 1052, 1064 (10th Cir. 2009) (ﬁnding a two-and-a-half month delay to be
unreasonable); Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Ala., 480 F.3d 1287, 1307 (11th Cir. 2007)
(holding a three-month delay unreasonable as a matter of law); Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Serv.,
Inc., 347 F.3d 1272, 1293 (11th Cir. 2003) (ﬁnding a two-and-a-half month delay to be unreasonable);
Bennet v. K-Mart Corp., 10 F. App’x 520, 521-22 (9th Cir. 2001) (ﬁnding a four-month delay
unreasonable as a matter of law); Macias v. Sw. Cheese Co., LLC, 181 F. Supp. 3d 883, 896 (D.N.M.
2016) (holding a ﬁve-month delay to be unreasonable).
89 Marks, supra note 70, at 1429.
90 876 F. Supp. 2d 270, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). The court noted that they were “unaware of any
case holding a 5–month, or shorter, delay in taking advantage of a sexual harassment policy to
preclude liability as a matter of law.” Id; see also United States v. Henry Cty., No. 09-4015, 2010 WL
3199687, at *11 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 2010) (declining to grant summary judgment though one employee
waited six months after the ﬁrst instance of harassment to report).
91 See supra note 88.
92 See, e.g., Reese v. Meritor Auto., Inc., 5 F. App’x 239, 244-245 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that
“evidence that the plaintiﬀ failed to utilize the company’s complaint procedure will normally suﬃce
to satisfy [the company’s] burden under the second element of the defense”); Madray v. Publix
Supermarkets, Inc., 208 F.3d 1290, 1301 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting the same); see also Kerri Lynn Stone,
Consenting Adults?: Why Women Who Submit to Supervisory Sexual Harassment Are Faring Better in
Court than Those Who Say No . . . and Why They Shouldn’t, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 25, 58 (2008)
(explaining that “courts often adhere rigidly to the requirement that plaintiﬀs follow the exact course
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has held that “once an employer has promulgated an effective antiharassment policy and disseminated that policy and associated procedures
to its employees, then it is incumbent upon the employees to utilize the
procedural mechanisms established by the company specifically to address
problems and grievances.”93
For example, in Madray v. Publix Supermarkets, although the plaintiﬀ told
multiple assistant managers and a manager of another department that her
supervisor would inappropriately hug, touch, and kiss her, because the
plaintiﬀ did not complain to the store, district, or divisional manager per her
employer’s anti-harassment policy, she was found to have acted unreasonably
as a matter of law.94 Similarly, in Cooper v. CLP Corp., the Eleventh Circuit
found that the plaintiﬀ ’s delay in reporting was unreasonable as a matter of
law because although he reported his allegations of harassment to the
defendant-employer’s district manager, the district manager “was not one of
the company representatives to whom [the plaintiﬀ] was supposed to report
harassment under the policy” so this complaint was not suﬃcient.95
Finding that such plaintiﬀs, even those who informally complained, were
unreasonable as a matter of law does not work to deter workplace harassment.
In such cases, even if an employee felt comfortable reporting that harassment
to someone in the company, courts have found this to be insuﬃcient. When
federal courts misconstrue the circumstances to grant summary judgment in
favor of the defendant-employer, they prevent the actualization of the goal of
encouraging employees to report.
3. Courts’ Unwillingness to Consider Plaintiﬀs’ Rationale for Waiting to
Report Instances of Harassment
Even if a plaintiﬀ has a justiﬁed reason for delaying to report, courts are
quick to dismiss these rationales in considering the second element of the
Faragher-Ellerth defense. Women may fear that they will be ﬁred, demoted,
treated adversely at work, or subjected to social ostracization because “no one
will believe them, or . . . reporting will make the situation at work worse.”96
of action prescribed by a defendant’s policy, even if a plaintiﬀ acted in a manner that was reasonably
calculated or likely to put the defendant on actual notice of harassment requiring correction”).
93 Madray, 208 F.3d at 1300 (internal quotations omitted).
94 Id. at 1293, 1300.
95 679 F. App’x 851, 855 (11th Cir. 2017).
96 Anne Lawton, Between Scylla and Charybdis: The Perils of Reporting Sexual Harassment, 9 U.
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 603, 618-19 (2007); Nicole Buonocore Porter, Ending Harassment by Starting
with Retaliation, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 49, 51 (2018); see also Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of
Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form Over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S
L.J. 1, 23 (2003) (“Sexual harassment victims have traditionally tended not to utilize internal complaint
procedures or otherwise formally report problems of harassment.”).
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Studies have found that “a common reaction by victims is to ignore the
harassment or take ‘costly steps’ to avoid the harasser or the job” such that the
“least frequent response is to report.”97 Such fears are not unsubstantiated, as
one study found that upwards of 75% of women who have reported instances
of harassment in the workplace were retaliated against by their employer.98
However, federal courts have repeatedly held that “[a] generalized fear of
retaliation does not excuse a failure to report sexual harassment.”99 Courts
have held that to substantiate her claims, the employee-plaintiﬀ must provide
speciﬁc, credible evidence that she will be retaliated against, and failure to do
so will result in the employer-defendant satisfying the second element of the
defense.100 Despite this, even in instances in which an employee provided
evidence to support her fear of retaliation, many courts have discredited that
evidence and granted judgment for the employer as a matter of law.101
For example, in Terry v. Laurel Oaks Behavioral Health Center, the plaintiﬀ
alleged that her supervisor propositioned her to engage in sexual activity

Porter, supra note 96, at 51.
Feldblum & Lipnic, supra note 7, at 16 (citing Lilia M. Cortina & Vicki J. Magley, Raising
Voice, Risking Retaliation: Events Following Interpersonal Mistreatment in the Workplace, 8(4) J.
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PSYCHOL. 247, 255 (2003)); see also Hebert, supra note 45, at 741 (“[S]tudies
of women who have made complaints of sexual harassment demonstrate that such women have often
faced retaliation, including ostracization by their coworkers, loss of opportunities for advancement,
transfer to less desirable positions, and even loss of employment.”).
99 Dowdy v. North Carolina, 23 F. App’x 121, 123 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Barrett v. Applied
Radiant Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262, 267 (4th Cir. 2001)); see also, e.g., McKinney v. G4S Gov’t Sol.,
Inc., 711 F. App’x 130, 137 (4th Cir. 2017) (noting fear of retaliation does not relieve duty to report);
Thornton v. Fed. Express Corp., 530 F.3d 451, 457 (6th Cir. 2008) (same); Adams v. O’Reilly Auto.,
Inc., 538 F.3d 926, 932 (8th Cir. 2008) (same); Howard v. City of Robertsdale, 168 F. App’x 883, 888
(11th Cir. 2006) (same); An v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 94 F. App’x 667, 675 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing
Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 284 F.3d 1014, 1026 (10th Cir. 2001)) (same); Hill v. Am. Gen. Fin.,
Inc., 218 F.3d 639, 644 (7th Cir. 2000) (same).
100 See, e.g., Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., Inc., 333 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting that “for
policy reasons representing a compromise, more than ordinary fear or embarrassment is needed” to
substantiate such a claim); Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 295 (2d Cir. 1999)
(noting that the plaintiﬀ ’s reasons for waiting to report instances of harassment “[were] not based
on a credible fear that . . . she would suﬀer some adverse employment action as a result of ﬁling a
complaint”); see also Thornton, 530 F.3d at 457 (citing Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., Inc., 347
F.3d 1272, 1290-91 (11th Cir. 2003)) (noting that the plaintiﬀ did not provide evidence that she was
subject to a “credible threat of retaliation”); Howard v. City of Robertsdale, 168 F. App’x 883, 888
(11th Cir. 2006) (explaining that because the plaintiﬀ only asserted a “generalized fear of retaliation,
and the record oﬀer[ed] no objective evidence to substantiate her fear,” the defendant-employer
satisﬁed the second element of the defense). But see Venuti, supra note 25, at 554 (explaining that
“[i]n situations where plaintiﬀs assert that a subjective fear prevented them from promptly reporting
harassment, courts typically seek evidence of a credible threat”).
101 See Hebert, supra note 45, at 725 (“Courts have generally rejected the contentions of
employees that they justiﬁably delayed reporting sexual harassment because of their fears of
retaliation. Even courts that have expressed a willingness to consider [it] . . . have insisted on
objective evidence of the likelihood of retaliatory conduct.”).
97
98
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several times, among other comments.102 However, the court found that
because the plaintiﬀ waited six months to report the harassment after the ﬁrst
alleged incident, her delay in reporting was unreasonable as a matter of law,
even though she explained that she delayed reporting out of fear of losing her
job.103 After reporting the harassment, the plaintiﬀ was ﬁred, as she predicted
and feared, “when she refused to sign a counseling form based upon alleged
misconduct arising from an [unrelated] incident”; this may have provided
objective, circumstantial evidence that her fears were substantiated.104
The Second Circuit has even gone a step further by explicitly instituting
a burden-shifting analysis, not promulgated by the Supreme Court, that
further places the onus on the victim. The Second Circuit has held that
“[o]nce an employer has satisﬁed its initial burden of demonstrating that an
employee has completely failed to avail herself of the complaint procedure,
the burden of production shifts to the employee to come forward with one or
more reasons why the employee did not make use of the procedures.”105 In
Eichler v. American Intern Group, Inc., for example, the plaintiﬀ alleged that
her immediate supervisor, Vince Corteselli, frequently made sexist remarks
to her,106 and the court held that the employer still satisﬁed the second
element of the defense.107 The court reasoned that because the plaintiﬀ waited
approximately a year until she oﬃcially reported the harassment to human
resources, she breached “her ‘obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm.’”108

102 1 F. Supp. 3d 1250, 1258-59 (M.D. Ala. 2014). The plaintiﬀ also alleged that her supervisor
“wrapped his arm around her neck, while asking her why she would not come to his house” and that
“he accused her of playing hard to get and told her that he was going to keep trying until she ‘gave
in’ to him.” Id. The plaintiﬀ ’s supervisor also made many other inappropriate comments such as
approaching her and “look[ing] at his genitals while remarking, ‘[y]ou see what you do to me?’” and
sitting next to her during meetings and bumping his leg against the plaintiﬀ ’s despite her asking
him to stop. Id. at 1259.
103 Id. at 1275. The plaintiﬀ argued that she delayed reporting instances of harassment because
she believed that human resources ﬁred employees without just reason. Id.
104 Id. at 1262, 1275.
105 Leopold v. Baccarat, Inc., 239 F.3d 243, 246 (2d Cir. 2001).
106 No. 05-5167, 2007 WL 963279, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2007) (internal citations omitted).
The plaintiﬀ alleged that Cortieselli made comments such as, “You have tits. Just cry,” “if he and
[plaintiﬀ] were in Iran, he ‘would be able to stone [her] to death because [she] was a woman,’”
and ”‘Why don’t you ﬁnd a husband and go get married[?] Like, get out of here. Don’t be in the
work force.’” Id. Additionally, he frequently told her that she was “stupid,” cursed at her, and told
her that “‘[she] could make mistakes because she had breasts,’” among other comments. Id. at *4-5.
107 Id. at *12-13.
108 Id. at *11 (citing Barua v. Credit-Lyonnais, No. 97-7991, 1998 WL 915892, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 30, 1998)). The court also reasoned that although the plaintiﬀ complained in writing to
managers senior to Corteselli twice, the complaints did not refer to sexual harassment but only to
disrespectful conduct. For example, the plaintiﬀ reported that Cortesselli “repeatedly shouted that
[the plaintiﬀ] should ‘shut the fuck up and get the fuck out of his oﬃce.’” Id. at *10. The court
dismissed these concerns by stating that this evidence “added nothing to Corteselli’s statement other
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Furthermore, the court stated that because the plaintiﬀ did not bring credible
evidence that she feared retaliation, such as “evidence to the eﬀect that the
employer has ignored or resisted similar complaints or has taken adverse
actions against employees in response to such complaints,” the employerdefendant had met its burden of the defense.109
Courts have justified such reasoning by explaining that “advancing a
speculative ‘fear of retaliation’ . . . would undermine the primary objective
of Title VII and could result in more, not less, sexual harassment going
undetected.”110 But requiring substantive evidence to support a fear of
retaliation actually has the opposite effect. It propagates the notion that
women’s claims of harassment should not be believed, even when studies
have affirmatively found that reporting claims of harassment has led
employees to experience instances of retaliation, justifying their silence.111
One study that analyzed responses of 1,167 participants regarding their
experiences with reporting harassment found that, compared with those who
did not report, “those who voiced against their wrongdoers either directly or
indirectly (to colleagues) generally experienced more [social retaliation
victimization]” such as harassment, name-calling, ostracism, and threats.112
It is apparent that these fears are not merely speculative. Furthermore, rather
than encouraging women to report, this approach may actually impede
reporting, as victims may decide that reporting is not worthwhile because
their claims of harassment will likely be dismissed. Thus, this is also
representative of how the second element of the affirmative defense has been
problematically applied.

than an indication that he really wanted [the plaintiﬀ] to be quiet and leave. It thus was merely an
intensiﬁer.” Id.
109 Id. at *12-13; see also Delgado v. City of Stamford, No. 11-01735, 2015 WL 6675534, at *31
(D. Conn. Nov. 2, 2015) (finding that although the plaintiff showed evidence that “may give rise
to a reasonable inference that Plaintiff feared that [the supervisor] would retaliate if she
complained to his superiors” regarding one instance of alleged harassment, this did not “give rise
to a reasonable inference that Plaintiff feared that [the supervisor] would retaliate if she
complained about the alleged harassment that forms the basis of her hostile work environment
claim”). But see Venuti, supra note 25, at 556 (citing Leopold v. Baccart, Inc., 239 F.3d 243, 246
(2d Cir. 2001)) (explaining that “[t]he Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a
credible fear may be established if the ‘employer has ignored or resisted similar complaints’”).
110 Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262, 267 (4th Cir. 2001).
111 See Bergman et al., infra note 119 and related discussion.
112 Lilia M. Cortina & Vicki J. Magley, Raising Voice, Risking Retaliation: Events Following
Interpersonal Mistreatment in the Workplace, 8 J. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PSYCHOL. 247, 248,
259 (2003).
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4. The Invalidation of Victims’ Responses to Harassment Fails to Consider
the Psychological Impact Harassment Can Have on Victims
and Fails to Support the Goal of Deterring Harassment
Regardless, courts’ decisions to ﬁnd plaintiﬀs’ delays in reporting are
problematic as they fail to consider the psychological impact harassment can
have on victims. Courts are quick to jump to the conclusion that the dread
one may experience when reporting is insuﬃcient to justify a failure to report
harassment. In doing so, courts have explained that though matters related to
harassment “are of a delicate nature . . . [,] this ‘inevitable unpleasantness’
cannot excuse an employee from taking advantage of [the] employer’s
complaint procedure.’”113 Such reasoning fails to consider how this impact
may discourage women from reporting.
In Butler v. Maryland Aviation Administration, the plaintiﬀ alleged that she
was harassed by both of her supervisors: one supervisor stood, unannounced,
outside of her home “at odd hours of the day and night,” and the other
touched her genitals, called her sexual names, and described his sexual
preferences to her in a graphic manner.114 The court granted summary
judgment for the defendant-employer, and found that the employer satisﬁed
the second element of the defense because the plaintiﬀ-employee endured
harassment for over a year without reporting it.115 The court explicitly noted
that it could not consider the “unpleasantness” associated with reporting a
claim of harassment, thus allowing the defendant-employer to escape liability
despite the unacceptable conduct by the plaintiﬀ ’s supervisors.116 The courts
have failed to give due consideration to the extent to which harassment can
cause anxiety for victims, noting that “an employee’s subjective fears of
confrontation [and] unpleasantness . . . do not alleviate the employee’s duty
under Ellerth to alert the employer to the allegedly hostile environment.”117
113 Reese v. Meritor Auto., Inc., 5 F. App’x 239, 245 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Barret, 240 F.3d
at 268); see also Johnson v. Holder, No. 10-1222, 2013 WL 787667, at *12 (D.S.C. Jan. 16, 2013)
(noting the same); Butler v. Maryland Aviation Admin., No. 11-2854, 2012 WL 3541985, at *7
(D. Md. Aug. 14, 2012) (noting the same).
114 Butler, 2012 WL 3541985, at *1.
115 Id. at *7.
116 Id.
117 Thornton v. Fed. Express Corp., 530 F.3d 451, 457 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Williams v. Mo.
Dep’t of Mental Health, 407 F.3d 972, 977 (8th Cir. 2005)); Shaw v. AutoZone, Inc., 180 F.3d 806,
813 (7th Cir. 1999). See Matvia v. Bald Head Island Mgmt., Inc., 259 F.3d 261, 270 (4th Cir. 2001)
(explaining that “[w]hile such events might cause an employee stress, the unpleasantness cannot
override the duty to report sexual harassment.”); see also Howard v. City of Robertsdale, 168 F. App’x
883, 888 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting that fears of confrontation or unpleasantness do not alleviate a duty
to report); McInnis v. Fairﬁeld Cmtys., Inc., 458 F.3d 1129, 1141 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting the same);
Williams, 407 F.3d at 977 (same); Hill v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 218 F.3d 639, 644 (7th Cir. 2000)
(same); Carroll v. ATA Retail Serv., Inc., No. 14-00747, 2016 WL 8417377, at *10 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 8,
2016) (same); Moncel v. Sullivan’s of Ind., Inc., No. 12-1720, 2014 WL 1905485, at *6 (S.D. Ind. May
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Relying on such reasoning is problematic as it discounts “the stark
realities of being a harassment victim and feeling isolated, mistrusted, and
fearful” as well as traumatized.118 Studies have found that victims of
harassment may suﬀer forms of psychological distress from reporting.119 It is
possible that these eﬀects contribute to the underreporting of harassment
claims. A study that analyzed the longitudinal eﬀects of harassment on mental
health found that “harassment is a stressor that has a positive and linear
relationship with depressive aﬀect” and that there is “evidence that
harassment early in the career has long-term eﬀects on depressive symptoms
in adulthood.”120 The study noted that the stress of harassment may lead to
“feelings of anger, self-blame, and self-doubt” and “may diminish coping
resources, such as self-esteem and mastery.”121 Researchers have found that
“harassment victims are likely to have similar psychological symptoms as
those who experience traumatic events” and that victims of harassment have
had other negative physical side eﬀects such as sleep disturbances and
gastrointestinal disorders.122 The eﬀects harassment can have on mental
health may contribute to why seventy percent of victims of workplace
harassment “never even talk[] with a supervisor, manager, or union
representative about the harassing conduct” and are more likely to conﬁde in
a family member or friend.123
Further, courts’ disregard of the psychological toll harassment can take on
victims and their reasons for hesitating to report is especially problematic
because the Supreme Court has held that the defense is available when an
employee has been constructively discharged. If a plaintiﬀ alleges she was
constructively discharged, the plaintiﬀ “must show that the abusive working
environment became so intolerable that her resignation qualiﬁed as a ﬁtting
13, 2014) (same); Lee v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 912 F. Supp. 2d 375, 385 (W.D.N.C. 2012) (same); Butler,
2012 WL 3541985, at *7 (same).
118 Stone, supra note 92, at 50.
119 Mindy E. Bergman et al., The (Un)reasonableness of Reporting: Antecedents and Consequences
of Reporting Sexual Harassment, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 230, 237 (2002); see also Linda L.
Collinsworth, et al., In Harm’s Way: Factors Related to Psychological Distress Following Sexual
Harassment, 33 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 475, 485 (2009) (explaining that “[s]ocial science research has
repeatedly documented a connection between sexually harassing experiences and negative
psychological outcomes”); Jason N. Houle et al., The Impact of Sexual Harassment on Depressive
Symptoms During the Early Occupational Career, 1 SOC. & MENTAL HEALTH 89, 90 (2011),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3227029/
[https://perma.cc/4KAM-RGJ5]
(explaining that psychologists have “theorize[d] that sexual harassment is a stressor that can lead to
work withdrawal, career instability, job dissatisfaction, and poor mental and physical health”).
120 Houle, supra note 119, at 101.
121 Id. at 102.
122 Darius K-S. Chan et al., Examining the Job-Related, Psychological, and Physical Outcomes of
Workplace Sexual Harassment: A Meta-Analytic Review, 32 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 362, 363 (2008).
123 Feldblum & Lipnic, supra note 7, at 23; see also id. (noting that “sexually coercive behavior
was reported by only 30% of the women who experienced it.”).
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response.”124 In Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, the Supreme Court held
that constructive discharge alone is not a tangible employment action, and
thus an employer-defendant can raise the defense not only when an employee
leaves a place of employment on their own volition, but also in circumstances
in which they feel that they are subject to a workplace so hostile, they have
no choice but to resign.125 Thus, an employee who experiences the traumatic
eﬀects of harassment may feel forced to leave, and the employer may still be
able to escape liability by raising the aﬃrmative defense.
For example, in Wahlman v. DataSphere Technologies, the plaintiﬀs alleged
that their supervisors repeatedly sent them sexually explicit e-mails and
messages, verbally abused them, and continually called them derogatory and
sexist names.126 After one supervisor was not disciplined for having a verbal
outburst, he remarked that “he was ‘untouchable’ and that he could do
whatever he wanted”; the harassment continued after the plaintiﬀs’
supervisor made these remarks.127 The plaintiﬀs argued that they were
constructively discharged because they felt compelled to resign due to the
hostile work environment.128 The court still granted the defendantemployer’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the defendant was
entitled to the Faragher-Ellerth aﬃrmative defense.129 The court found that
the second element was also satisﬁed because the employees never reported
the harassment; however, the employment policy problematically required
the plaintiﬀs to report the harassment to one of the supervisors engaging in
the inappropriate conduct.130 Thus, the court was unwilling to consider the
plaintiﬀs’ rationale even in an instance where the plaintiﬀs felt forced out of
their workplace by the harassment.
Further, in failing to consider the psychological impact harassment can
have on victims, courts are failing to support the policy goals of Title VII.131
As noted, in establishing the affirmative defense, the Court in Faragher and
Ellerth sought to promote a policy that encouraged women to report

Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 134 (2004).
Id. at 152.
No. 12-1997, 2014 WL 794269, at *1-2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 27, 2014).
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at *9.
Id. The court found that the ﬁrst element of the defense was satisﬁed because the
defendant-employer had a harassment policy and had provided written and verbal warnings to one
supervisor. Id.
131 See Venuti, supra note 25, at 564 (“Courts granting summary judgment in favor of an
employer without fully considering the context that may cause a reporting delay is contrary to the
purpose of Title VII.”).
124
125
126
127
128
129
130

1086

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 168: 1061

instances of harassment.132 Federal courts have emphasized the importance
of notice, explaining that “[t]he law against sexual harassment is not selfenforcing and an employer cannot be expected to correct harassment unless
the employee makes a concerted effort to inform the employer that a
problem exists.”133 Through this, courts have placed an “obligation to use
reasonable care to avoid harm” on the victim.134
Applying such reasoning blames a victim for failing to report and does
not encourage employers to take a proactive view to deter harassment in the
workplace. Though courts have argued that excusing a delay in reporting
would be inconsistent with the goals of Title VII,135 it fails to give credence
to plaintiﬀs’ claims and does not serve to deter harm.
Overall, courts’ disregard of both plaintiﬀs’ reasons for delaying to report
and the psychological impact of harassment highlights the problematic
application of this defense.
III. #METOO AND A RECOGNIZED NEED FOR CHANGES IN THE LAW
RELATED TO WORKPLACE HARASSMENT
Considering the manner in which federal circuits apply both elements of
the defense, it is evident that employee-victims face numerous obstacles in
bringing their claims. In the immediate aftermath of Ellerth and Faragher,
scholars opined on the eﬀect these decisions would have on plaintiﬀemployee claims as it became apparent that “[t]he Ellerth defense is supposed
to impose upon employers the burden of proof under a conjunctively framed
two-pronged test, and both prongs of this test raise numerous, typically factsensitive questions about ‘reasonableness’ that one would think are generally

132 The Court in Faragher promoted the policy interests reﬂected in a 1990 EEOC statement
that noted employers should implement policies “designed to encourage victims of harassment to
come forward [without requiring] a victim to complain ﬁrst to the oﬀending supervisor.” Faragher
v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998) (internal quotations omitted).
133 Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262, 268 (4th Cir. 2001); see also
Pinkerton v. Colo. Dep’t of Transp., 563 F.3d 1052, 1063 (10th Cir. 2009) (applying this reasoning to
justify the defendant-employer’s fulﬁllment of the second prong of the defense, even though she
waited only two months to report instances of harassment); Leopold v. Baccarat, Inc., 239 F.3d 243,
246 (2d Cir. 2001) (placing the burden on plaintiﬀ-employees to provide justiﬁed reasons for failure
to report harassment); Shaw v. AutoZone, Inc., 180 F.3d 806, 813 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that “the
law of sexual harassment is not self-enforcing”); Payne v. Great Plains Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 348
F. Supp. 3d 1194, 1202 (N.D. Okla. 2018) (“As the Tenth Circuit has explained, adequate notice of
the sexually harassing conduct is a necessary precursor to trigger an employer’s duty to take
corrective action.”).
134 Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1272, 1290 (11th Cir. 2003).
135 See, e.g., Reese v. Meritor Auto., Inc., 5 F. App’x 239, 245 (4th Cir. 2001) (explaining that
“the eﬀects of excusing failures to report would be far reaching and inconsistent with Title VII’s goal
of purging the workplace of sexual harassment”).
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best suited for juries.”136 In the current era, over twenty years after the
Supreme Court upheld the Faragher-Ellerth aﬃrmative defense, it is time to
revisit its application. In the wake of #MeToo, courts should place a greater
focus on the reasonableness of the plaintiﬀ and provide more weight to the
credibility of their claims. Overall, it is time to redeﬁne what reasonableness
means in the context of this aﬃrmative defense.
A. The Influence of the #MeToo Movement
The #MeToo movement has shed greater light on the detrimental eﬀects
harassment can have on women. The movement has given “a microphone to
victims willing to share their experiences of harassment. It showcased the
lasting impact an act of [harassment]” can have.137 In addition to bringing
international attention to the issue, the movement has begun to inﬂuence the
legal sphere as well.
Currently, many states are passing, or seeking to pass, legislation that
aﬀects non-disclosure and non-disparagement provisions.138 For example, “a
broad non-disparagement provision could restrict a party from making even
truthful statements about the other if that would adversely aﬀect the other’s
reputation.”139 Because many employers require new hires to sign agreements
that include such provisions, some provisions may limit employees ability to
speak out about allegations of workplace harassment.140 However, several
states have introduced and passed legislation making such agreements,
particularly non-disclosure agreements, unenforceable if they limit an
employee’s ability to disclose allegations of sexual harassment.141 Several
states have adopted legislation that seeks to ban non-disclosure agreements
as related to sexual harassment and discrimination.142 A bill was also
introduced in Congress that would outlaw non-disclosure and non-

Marks, supra note 70, at 1437.
See Elizabeth Tippett, The Legal Implications of the MeToo Movement, 103 MINN. L. REV.
229, 242 (2018).
138 Elizabeth Tippett, Non-Disclosure Agreements and the #MeToo Movement, A. BAR ASS’N,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/dispute_resolution/publications/dispute_resolution_magazine
/2019/winter-2019-me-too/non-disclosure-agreements-and-the-metoo-movement/
[https://perma.cc/RZ5D-3DSK].
139 Id.
140 See, e.g., id.
141 Id.
142 Anna North, 7 Positive Changes that Have Come from the #MeToo Movement, VOX (Oct. 4,
2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/identities/2019/10/4/20852639/me-too-movement-sexualharassment-law-2019 [https://perma.cc/CXV9-L5QL] (“In September 2018, California banned the
agreements in cases involving sexual assault, harassment, or sex discrimination. New York and New
Jersey enacted similar laws.”).
136
137
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disparagement agreements in employment contracts to ensure victims of
workplace harassment are not silenced.143
Likewise, certain courts are beginning to recognize the admissibility of
“me-too” evidence, which entails “other instances of discrimination or
harassment against other employees by the alleged harasser or the same
employer” that can be used “in an effort to show a pattern or practice of
misconduct to prove or at least bolster discrimination or harassment
claims.”144 Although the question of the admissibility of this kind of
evidence arose before the #MeToo movement, and the Supreme Court
previously ruled “that such evidence is neither per se admissible nor per se
inadmissible,”145 in light of the movement several federal courts have
allowed such probative evidence to support such hostile work environment
claims.146
Additionally, attention has been brought to the “severe and pervasive”
standard of hostile work environment claims. Federal courts have historically
found that certain conduct may not be grave enough to meet the standard of
severe or pervasive, even if an employee had been subject to frequent
inappropriate conduct.147 However, in the wake of #MeToo, many have
criticized the stringent manner in which this element has been applied, and
scholars have predicted that the movement may inﬂuence how judges
approach the application of this element of such claims.148 Signiﬁcantly, in
143 Lauren Holter, What is the EMPOWER Act? This Workplace Harassment Bill Could Make
NDAs a Thing of the Past, BUSTLE (July 17, 2018), https://www.bustle.com/p/what-is-the-empoweract-this-workplace-harassment-bill-could-make-ndas-a-thing-of-the-past-9792924
[https://perma.cc/G5MC-GAG2].
144 Justin Hanassab & Kathryn T. McGuigan, “Me-Too” Evidence in the Era of the #MeToo
Movement, 3 BENDER’S CAL. LAB. & EMP. BULL. 71, 71, 73 (2018), https://www.morganlewis.com//media/ﬁles/publication/outside-publication/article/2018/bendersca-metoo-evidencemarch2018.ashx [https://perma.cc/R2R3-PX5C].
145 Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 522 U.S. 379, 381 (2008).
146 See Hanassab & McGuigan, supra note 144, at 73-74.
147 See H.R. 2148, 116th Cong. § 204(a)(17) (2019) (explaining that “some lower court decisions
further have interpreted the ‘severe or pervasive’ language in the Meritor decision so narrowly as to
recognize only the most egregious conduct as unlawful, despite Congress’ intent that title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 aﬀord a broad scope of protection from discrimination”); see also Mitchell
v. Pope, 189 F. App’x 911, 913-14 (11th Cir. 2006) (ﬁnding that instances of sexually derogatory
remarks and oﬀensive touching did not meet the severe or pervasive standard).
148 See e.g., Sandra F. Sperino & Suja A. Thomas, Boss Grab Your Breasts? That’s Not (Legally)
Harassment, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/29/opinion/harassmentemployees-laws-.html [https://perma.cc/HUP6-GZPQ] (“[A] supervisor raping an employee has
consistently been viewed as ‘severe’ enough to meet the bar . . . . Other conduct, by contrast, is never
going to meet the threshold—say, if a supervisor asks an employee out on a date once and does not
treat her diﬀerently after she declines. In the middle, however, some judges see an area of
uncertainty. And in such cases, courts often err on the side of dismissal.”); see also Rebecca White,
Title VII and the #MeToo Movement, 68 EMORY L.J. ONLINE 1, 7 (2018),
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2159&context=fac_artchop
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2019, the BE HEARD Act was introduced before Congress and seeks to
redeﬁne this standard.149
The emphasis this movement has brought to issues of harassment can aid
in changing the way instances of workplace harassment are handled.
However, the founder of the #MeToo movement, Tarana Burke, has
expressed concern over the direction the movement has taken, noting that
“[s]uddenly, a movement to centre survivors of sexual violence is being talked
about as a vindictive plot against men.”150 Thus, the focus should be centered
on changing the law in order to best support survivors of harassment. Social
movements can fade from the spotlight or be misconstrued to achieve
political aim, but the law is what will enable change to endure.151
Based on the problematic nature in which the Faragher-Ellerth defense has
been applied, federal courts should take an approach that emphasizes
consideration of the reasonableness of the plaintiﬀs’ actions and their
employers’ response. This framework should set a standard that aims to
eradicate the incongruous applications of both the ﬁrst and second element
of the defense. With regard to the ﬁrst element, rather than accepting that
the implementation of an anti-harassment policy is satisfactory at face value,
the approach should encourage consideration of whether the policy the
employer put in place to prevent harassment had the means of being eﬀective.
Additionally, it should encourage consideration of whether the employer’s
eﬀorts to correct instances of harassment were reasonable in light of the
circumstances. This framework should prevent courts from engaging in
burden-shifting analyses or approaches that allow courts to circumvent any
aspect of the defense. Similarly, it should deter courts from systematically
finding that a delay in the employee’s reporting is unreasonable as a matter

[https://perma.cc/VX5T-P233] (noting that “lower courts . . . have freedom to determine that
conduct that may not have been regarded as suﬃciently severe or pervasive even just a few years
ago should now be recognized as actionable”); Tippett, supra note 137, at 242 (“Judges of all stripes
may be inﬂuenced by MeToo in ways that alter their application of the legal rules.”).
149 The Act’s name stands for “Bringing an End to Harassment by Enhancing Accountability
and Rejecting Discrimination in the Workplace.” Vania Leveille & Lenora M. Lapidus, The BE
HEARD Act Will Overhaul Workplace Harassment Laws, ACLU (Apr. 10, 2019),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/womens-rights/womens-rights-workplace/be-heard-act-will-overhaulworkplace-harassment-laws [https://perma.cc/AM8M-VDT5]. The bill addresses the issue of an
inexact, severe, and pervasive standard and seeks to establish a uniform standard of liability to be
applied in cases of workplace harassment. H.R. 2148, 116th Cong. § 204(a)(11)-(19), (b)(2) (2019).
150 Tarana Burke: MeToo Movement Not a War Against Men, BBC (Feb. 21, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-51574913/tarana-burke-metoo-movement-not-a-war-againstmen [https://perma.cc/6AJM-L4X8]; Jane Wakeﬁeld, MeToo Founder Tarana Burke: Campaign Now
“Unrecognizable”,
BBC (Nov.
28,
2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-46393369
[https://perma.cc/8TX3-BDG8].
151 Last year, scholar Elizabeth Tippett predicted that the #MeToo movement could inﬂuence
court decisions, including those with respect to Faragher-Ellerth. See Tippett, supra note 137, at 243.
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of law. As these cases typically involve fact-speciﬁc issues, courts should
refrain from determining these issues as a matter of law. The goal of this
approach would be to ameliorate the aforementioned issues with the FaragherEllerth defense, speciﬁcally to prevent inconsistent applications of the defense
and to encourage courts to recognize the psychological impact harassment
may have on women. Overall, it would seek to inhibit courts from granting
summary judgment in instances where there is merit to the plaintiﬀ ’s claim,
and to seek to deter future instances of workplace harassment.
One such approach has been recognized by the Third Circuit in a case
published in July of 2018. In Minarsky v. Susquehanna County,152 the Third
Circuit explicitly acknowledged the impact of the #MeToo movement and
emphasized that a standard of reasonableness should govern the application
of the Faragher-Ellerth defense.153 The court recognized that it should not
presume the defendant-employer followed best practices with respect to the
ﬁrst element of the defense, and the court acknowledged the impact
harassment can have on the responses and reactions of victims.154 The court
found that such reasonableness is best left for the jury to decide.155 As of now,
no other jurisdiction outside of the Third Circuit has adopted this
approach.156 The adoption of this, or a similar approach, would result in a
more uniform application of the defense and can help lead to more justiﬁed
outcomes for victims.
B. The Recognition of #MeToo in the Third Circuit’s
Interpretation of Faragher-Ellerth
The Third Circuit’s opinion in Minarsky v. Susquehanna County addressed
the Faragher-Ellerth aﬃrmative defense through a more appropriate lens in
light of the #MeToo movement and increased attention to workplace
harassment. In this case, the Third Circuit addressed head-on how the “appeal
[came] to us in the midst of national news regarding a veritable ﬁrestorm of
allegations of rampant sexual misconduct that has been closeted for years, not
reported by the victims.”157 The plaintiﬀ, Minarsky, worked as a part-time
secretary for Yadlosky at the Susquehanna County Department of Veterans
Aﬀairs beginning in 2009.158 Yadlosky was her direct supervisor.159 Minarsky
895 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 2018).
See infra Section III.B.
Id.
Id.
A search on Westlaw’s public court records reveals that the only district courts that have
applied the reasoning in Minarsky speciﬁcally are courts within the Third Circuit.
157 Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 313 n.12.
158 Id. at 306.
159 Id.
152
153
154
155
156
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alleged that Yadlosky would try to “massage her shoulders or touch her face”
each week and would try to kiss her each Friday before she left “pull[ing]
[her] against him.”160 Minarsky also alleged that Yadlosky would question her
whereabouts if she left on a lunch break and would call her at home to ask
personal questions.161 Additionally, Yadlosky would send Minarsky sexually
explicit messages from his work computer, to which Minarsky would never
respond, among other inappropriate conduct.162
Susquehanna County had an anti-harassment policy that detailed that an
employee could report any harassment committed by a supervisor to the
Chief County Clerk or a County Commissioner.163 Minarsky never ﬁled a
formal report of harassment because Minarsky witnessed the Chief County
Clerk unsuccessfully reprimand Yadlosky for his inappropriate behavior
towards other women on two occasions, and “there was no further action or
follow-up, nor was any notation or report placed in Yadlosky’s personnel
ﬁle.”164 Furthermore, Minarsky claimed that Yadlosky warned her not to trust
the County Commissioners or Chief County Clerk and that they would
terminate her position if she did not “look busy.”165 In 2013, after four years,
Minarsky eventually conﬁded in a co-worker about the harassment; the coworker’s supervisor, overhearing the conversation, reported the harassment
to the Chief County Clerk.166 After an investigation, Yadlosky’s employment
was eventually terminated.167
Minarsky brought a hostile work environment claim against Susquehanna
County.168 The district court granted summary judgment to the defendantemployer, holding that the county had satisﬁed both elements of the FargherEllerth aﬃrmative defense.169 The district court, in accepting
recommendations set by the magistrate judge for this case,170 found that the
county satisﬁed the ﬁrst element because it had an anti-harassment policy,
had reprimanded Yadlosky on two occasions in the past, and had terminated

Id.
Id. at 307.
Id.
Id. at 308.
Id. at 307.
Id. at 308.
Id. at 308-09.
Id. at 309.
Id.
Id.
Per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, a district judge may refer review of a dispositive
motion to a magistrate judge; the district court may conduct a de novo review of the
recommendation and accept, reject, or modify the magistrate judge’s recommendation de novo. FED.
R. CIV. P. 72(b). Here, the district court adopted the ﬁndings of the Magistrate Judge in this case.
See Minarsky v. Susquehanna Cty., No. 14-2021, 2017 WL 44759781, at *1 (M.D. Pa. May 22, 2017).
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
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Yadolsky’s employment in light of Minarsky’s allegations.171 The court held
“that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly
any sexually harassing behavior.”172 The lower court found that the second
element of the oﬀense was also met, adopting the Magistrate Judge’s ﬁnding
that Minarsky’s failure to report the harassment was not reasonable:
“Minarsky’s alleged apprehension of the Chief Clerk and County
Commissioners [were] unreasonable, because her mistrust of them came
‘from the very employee Minarsky claims was harassing her,’ and was not
suﬃcient to excuse her failure to report.”173 The district court also adopted
the ﬁnding that no reasonable jury could ﬁnd that Minarsky acted reasonably
in delaying to report.174
On appeal, the Third Circuit rejected this analysis and brought to light
the problematic way in which the Faragher-Ellerth defense has been applied
over the past two decades. Throughout its analysis, the Third Circuit
emphasized that the jury was in the best position to determine the
reasonableness of the situation, describing how “[t]he cornerstone of this
analysis is reasonableness: the reasonableness of the employer’s preventative
and corrective measures, and the reasonableness of the employee’s eﬀorts (or
lack thereof) to report misconduct and avoid further harm.”175
With regard to the first element of the defense, the Third Circuit held
that although the county had a policy in place, there were issues of material
fact, and “[the court] cannot agree that the County’s responses were so
clearly sufficient as to warrant the District Court’s conclusion as a matter
of law.”176 The Third Circuit emphasized that the reasonableness of the
employer’s approach was best left to the jury to decide; although Yadlosky’s
employment was terminated, a jury could potentially find that the
defendant-employer did not follow best practices considering that Yadlosky
was previously reprimanded twice without further consequences.177
With regard to the second element of the defense, the Third Circuit
declined to hold that Minarsky was unreasonable as a matter of law, even
though Minarsky waited four years to report the allegations of harassment.178
The Third Circuit emphasized how the circumstances of harassment can
cause an employee to wait to report, explaining that:
Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 310-11.
Id. at 313 (citing Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998)).
Id. at 311 (citing Minarsky, 2017 WL 44759781, at *6).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 312.
Id.
The Third Circuit explained that Minarsky’s fear of being ﬁred, fear of Yadlosky’s hostility,
and belief that her eﬀorts were futile were understandable “countervailing forces” that were
additionally exacerbated by her “pressing ﬁnancial situation” at the time. Id. at 314.
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
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[W]e write to clarify that a mere failure to report one’s harassment is not per se
unreasonable. Moreover, the passage of time is just one factor in the analysis.
Workplace sexual harassment is highly circumstance-speciﬁc, and thus the
reasonableness of a plaintiﬀ ’s actions is a paradigmatic question for the jury,
in certain cases.179

The Court continued by explaining that:
If a plaintiff’s genuinely held, subjective belief of potential retaliation from
reporting her harassment appears to be well-founded, and a jury could find that
this belief is objectively reasonable, the trial court should not find that the
defendant has proven the second Faragher-Ellerth element as a matter of law.
Instead, the court should leave the issue for the jury to determine at trial.180

The Third Circuit stressed that although federal courts have frequently
found a plaintiﬀ ’s hesitance or failure to report unreasonable, courts should
consider how power dynamics between an employee and her supervisor can
provide context to a plaintiﬀ ’s fear of reporting; thus, courts should give
greater credence to an employee’s rationale for delaying or avoiding
reporting.181 The court explicitly referenced how, in many instances, a victim
of harassment may “assert[] a plausible fear of serious adverse consequences
had they spoken up at the time that the conduct occurred” and although the
policy of the aﬃrmative defense “places the onus on the harassed employee
to report her harasser, and would fault her for not calling out this conduct so
as to prevent it, a jury could conclude that the employee’s non-reporting was
understandable, perhaps even reasonable.”182
Although the Third Circuit recognized that they “are sensitive to the
Supreme Court’s emphasis that the second Faragher-Ellerth element is tied to
the objective of Title VII, to avoid harm, rather than provide redress,” the
court explained that it is not correct to presume that reporting harassment
will always end the conduct, and victims may have legitimate fear relating to
reporting due to the circumstances.183 This approach provides legitimacy to
women’s claims of harassment and fears that it may prevent one from
speaking out.
This approach’s conceptualization of reasonableness as the “cornerstone”
of the oﬀense, and emphasis that such fact-speciﬁc inquiries are best left to
the jury, has redeﬁned the application of this oﬀense to provide an outcome
more favorable to victims of workplace harassment. The deﬁnition of
179
180
181
182
183

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 313 n.12.
Id. at 313 n.12, 315.
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“reasonableness” as related to the defense has seemingly been misapplied, as
federal courts have shoehorned the facts of many cases into the corners of
the affirmative defense, despite the existence of evidence of which a
reasonable jury could possibly find the defendant-employer liable. Here, the
Third Circuit explicitly recognized that the law needs to give greater
attention to this issue, referencing the #MeToo movement: “It has come to
light, years later, that people in positions of power and celebrity have
exploited their authority to make unwanted sexual advances.”184 The court
reaffirmed that the heart of the defense is reasonableness, highlighting the
problematic and inconsistent application of the defense by federal courts and
emphasizing how it is inappropriate for courts to hold, as a matter of law,
that an employer’s decision to wait to report instances of harassment are
unreasonable given the detrimental effects harassment can have on a victim.
C. Applying an Approach Centered Around Reasonableness to
Supervisory Harassment Cases
Federal courts nationwide should adopt an approach centered around
reasonableness with respect to both prongs of the Faragher-Ellerth aﬃrmative
defense, like the approach articulated by the Third Circuit in Minarsky, and
should encourage courts to refrain from deciding these issues as a matter of
law. This will diminish the inconsistent applications of the defense and help
recognize the justiﬁable reasons that women may wait to report instances of
harassment. This will provide a greater means for deterring harassment and
allow employees to survive summary judgment in appropriate instances.185
1. Application to the First Element of the Aﬃrmative Defense
Adoption of an approach centered on reasonableness would reduce federal
courts’ inconsistent applications of the ﬁrst element of the defense. As noted,
federal courts have taken diﬀering approaches when applying the prevention

184 Id. at 313 n.12; see also, Alejandra Arroyave Lopez, Workplace Sexual Harassment Claim
Revived Despite Delay in Reporting Misconduct, LAPIN & LEICHTLING (July 17, 2018),
https://www.workplacesexualharassmentlaw.com/2018/07/workplace-sexual-harassment-claimrevived-despite-delay-reporting-misconduct/ [https://perma.cc/A2F3-VK37] (“Sheri Minarsky’s
case is an example of how the law is being shaped by so many victims coming forward in the #metoo
Movement, allowing victims more opportunities to seek redress for inexcusable conduct.”).
185 See e.g., Paul Mollica, Minarsky v. Susquehanna Cty., No. 17-2646 (3d Cir. July 3, 2018),
OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP (July 3, 2018), https://www.employmentlawblog.info/2018/07/minarskyv-susquehanna-cty-no-17-2646-3d-cir-july-3-2018.shtml [https://perma.cc/4KVK-Y9E5] (urging
“[e]mployee advocates in this area . . . to rally behind this language, which portends a change in the
way that harassment cases should be adjudicated”).

2020]

Redefining Reasonableness

1095

and correction sub-prongs of the ﬁrst element.186 Applying the Third
Circuit’s standard of reasonableness would prevent courts from ﬁnding that
mere distribution of an anti-harassment policy is adequate to satisfy the
prevention prong of the ﬁrst element of the defense and encourage
consideration of whether the policy itself is suﬃcient in preventing workplace
harassment.187 This issue is best left for the jury to decide, rather than
allowing the court to determine that the employer’s anti-harassment policy is
facially valid.
Similarly, this approach would eliminate the unsubstantiated, rebuttable
presumptions that plaintiﬀ-employees are forced to overcome in several
jurisdictions.188 As noted, the Fourth Circuit has applied an approach that
requires a plaintiﬀ to provide evidence that her employer adopted an antiharassment policy in bad faith or “‘was otherwise defective or dysfunctional’”
in order to show that the prevention prong has not been satisﬁed.189 If the
aforementioned approach to reasonableness had been applied in McKinney v.
G4S Government Solutions,190 the court would likely not have granted
summary judgment against the plaintiﬀ. In that case, the plaintiﬀ ’s supervisor
allegedly threatened employees to not utilize the policy or make complaints,
but the court still held the defendant-employer satisﬁed the prevention
prong.191 A court in this instance should question the reasonableness of the
employers’ actions and should not ﬁnd that the defendant-employer’s
prevention methods were satisfactory as a matter of law; instead, this should
be left for the jury to decide.
As noted, some federal courts have seemingly circumvented applying the
second prong of this element, the correction prong; the Eleventh Circuit and
the district courts within its jurisdiction have done so,192 while other federal

186 See supra Section II.A. Scholars have previously proposed implementing a standard such as
the “reasonable woman” standard, considering that women respond and react diﬀerently to such
harassment than men. See Hebert, supra note 45, at 732-42. I would argue that this approach
propagates a gender divide, and that a standard “reasonableness” approach is more appropriate.
187 See supra note 56 and related discussion. Though having juries resolve such claims could
result in inconsistent outcomes, adopting an approach like the Third Circuit’s would better resolve
the problem of inconsistent application of the defense among federal courts that leads to
unreasonable grants of summary judgment in favor of defendant-employers.
188 See Matvia v. Bald Head Island Mgmt., Inc., 259 F.3d 261, 268 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that
the Fourth Circuit applies the presumption that distribution of a harassment policy provides a
rebuttable presumption that the employer exercised reasonable care with respect to the ﬁrst prong
that the employee can only overcome with evidence that the policy was made in bad faith or was
otherwise defective); see also supra note 55 and related discussion.
189 Walton v. N.C. Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 494 F. App’x 300, 302 (4th Cir. 2012)
(citing Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262, 266 (4th Cir. 2001)).
190 179 F. Supp. 3d 609, 623 (W.D. Va. 2016).
191 Id.
192 See supra note 64 and related discussion.
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courts have required evidence that the employer’s correction methods “must
[have been] calculated to prevent further harassment.”193 Here, the
reasonableness of the employers should not be determined as a matter of law.
In the aforementioned case of Scott v. Publix, the Southern District of Florida
found it was not necessary to apply the correction prong because the plaintiff
did not provide notice to her employer of the alleged harassment.194 This is
an instance where the court should not have determined that the defendantemployer satisfied this sub-prong; it would be best left for the jury to
examine the defendant-employer’s reasonableness and decide whether the
approach the employer took was sufficient, or if the employer should have
taken more action.195
Overall, greater consideration should be taken in determining whether
the defendant-employer has succeeded in both preventing and correcting
instances of harassment. Courts should recognize that determining the
appropriate level of reasonableness should not be decided as a matter of law;
this will aid to prevent the application of inconsistent standards courts
currently apply to the defense.
2. Application to the Second Element of the Aﬃrmative Defense
Applying this standard of reasonableness to the second element of the
aﬃrmative defense would also aid in resolving the inconsistent applications
of the defense. Speciﬁcally, this would erode the circuit split related to singleonset cases. As noted, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits provide that if an
employee experiences a single, severe case of harassment, her claim will be
dismissed if the defendant-employer meets only the ﬁrst element of the
aﬃrmative defense.196 If an approach like the Third Circuit’s is applied, it
would help to resolve this circuit split, and employees would not be at risk of
having their claim of a severe instance of harassment fail at summary
judgment in those jurisdictions. For example, if the reasonableness approach
had been adopted in the aforementioned case of Indest v. Freeman Decorating,
Inc.,197 the plaintiﬀ would not have been barred from having her claim heard
on the merits simply because she was the victim of one, serious incident of
harassment. Adopting this approach would allow plaintiﬀs across
193 Cerros v. Steel Tech., Inc., 398 F.3d 944, 953 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing McKenzie v. Ill. Dep’t
of Transp., 92 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir. 1996)); see supra note 69 and related discussion.
194 No. 07-60624, 2008 WL 2940672, at *7 (S.D. Fla. July 28, 2008); see supra note 66 and
related discussion.
195 But see supra note 69 and related discussion; Leopold v. Baccarat, Inc., 239 F.3d 243, 245 (2d
Cir. 2001) (noting that it is not necessary to consider whether the employer’s prevention and
correction methods were successful).
196 See supra Section II.B.
197 164 F.3d 258, 260 (5th Cir. 1999).
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jurisdictions to have more consistent expectations of their claims at the
pleadings stage, so that one plaintiﬀ would not be more likely than another
to win at the summary judgment stage depending on which jurisdiction the
claim is brought in. It would also aﬀord plaintiﬀs the opportunity for a more
just outcome, rather than allowing courts to inequitably dispose of such
claims through summary judgment.
Further, federal courts have frequently held that an employee’s decision
to delay reporting for a few weeks or months is unreasonable as a matter of
law, enabling the defendant-employer to succeed at summary judgment.198
The Supreme Court has never provided for a bright-line rule that indicates
how long an employee is permitted to wait before reporting, resulting in
uncertainty as to how this element should be evaluated. Courts should
recognize that “a mere failure to report one’s harassment is not per se
unreasonable” and that “[w]orkplace sexual harassment is highly
circumstance-speciﬁc, and thus the reasonableness of a plaintiﬀ’s actions is a
paradigmatic question for the jury” would limit the inclination of courts to
hold that a victim of harassment was unreasonable for waiting a few months
to report.199 In contrast with Hunt v. Wal-Mart Stores, in which the court held
the plaintiﬀ was unreasonable for waiting four months to report the incidents
of harassment,200 Minarsky waited four years to report, and the Third Circuit
still held that Minarsky’s reasonableness was for the jury to decide.
This approach aptly recognizes that harassment can cause trauma, and
that victims may feel uncomfortable expressing their concerns and
experiences with their employers. Though in Minarsky the Third Circuit
acknowledged that the underlying policy expressed in Faragher and Ellerth
was “to avoid harm, rather than provide redress,” the court emphasized how
the plaintiﬀ ’s reasons for failing to report should not be dismissed.201 The
emphasis on reasonableness recognizes that the judicial system should not
fault a victim for waiting to report or discount “an employee’s subjective fears
of confrontation” or “unpleasantness” that they may experience when coping
with the situation.202 The Third Circuit understood the “physical and
emotional toll” that harassment can have on a victim and did not disregard
the implications such conduct can have on one’s psyche.203

See supra Section II.C.
Minarsky v. Susquehanna County, 895 F.3d 303, 314 (3d Cir. 2018).
931 F.3d 624, 631 (7th Cir. 2019); see supra notes 83–87 and related discussion.
Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 313.
Thornton v. Fed. Express Corp., 530 F.3d 451, 457 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Williams v.
Missouri Dep’t of Mental Health, 407 F.3d 972, 977 (8th Cir. 2005)); see supra note 117 and
related discussion.
203 Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 316; see supra notes 101–117 and related discussion.
198
199
200
201
202
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Additionally, under this approach, the factfinders can be forgiving to
plaintiffs who may not follow their employer’s policy exactly. As noted,
courts have held that if a plaintiff reported an allegation of harassment to
their employer but diverged from the procedure outlined in the employer’s
anti-harassment policy, her conduct can be held unreasonable as a matter of
law.204 However, a plaintiff may not feel comfortable reporting an instance
of harassment to the party designated by her employer’s anti-harassment
policy. Thus, the court should not decide that it was unreasonable as a matter
of law for the plaintiff to report an incident of harassment to a party other
than the party designated in the employment policy, as this should be a
consideration for the jury.
Further, victims of harassment may have legitimate fears and reasons for
delaying their decisions to report, or for failing to report entirely. As noted, in
many instances federal courts have held that a plaintiff was unreasonable for
failing to report even though she feared that she would be retaliated against;
courts have required plaintiffs to provide credible evidence to substantiate
their claims and even shifted the burden on plaintiffs to report.205 In contrast,
an approach that emphasizes reasonableness supports giving weight to the
fears and claims of plaintiffs. The Third Circuit’s standard, as an exemplar,
encompasses both subjective and objective components, as the plaintiff must
hold a subjective fear of retaliation, and the jury must find this claim to be
objectively reasonable.206 This approach recognizes that plaintiffs’ subjective
fears should be given weight as credible evidence. This approach would allow
plaintiffs’ claims to survive summary judgment, rather than finding plaintiffs’
response to be unreasonable as a matter of law.
Overall, application of the Third Circuit’s framework provides great
consideration to the plaintiﬀs’ reasoning in deciding whether to report
incidents of harassments. It recognizes the psychological impact harassment
can have on victims, which federal courts tend to ignore. Other jurisdictions
should adopt an approach that emphasizes reasonableness as it will allow
plaintiﬀs to justly survive summary judgment, rather than prematurely
dismissing their claims.207

See supra subsection II.C.2.
See supra subsection II.C.3.
Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 314. In Minarsky, the court explained that if “[p]resented with these
facts, a reasonable jury could ﬁnd that Minarsky’s fears of aggravating her work environment was
suﬃciently speciﬁc, rather than simply a generalized, unsubstantiated fear.” Id. at 315.
207 Under this approach, the case can proceed to the jury, or may be settled, which can help
these claims have a more just result. See Marks, supra note 70, at 1452 (“The confounding challenge
of deciding these matters on summary judgment highlights the especially appropriate role of the
jury in deciding the impact of the Ellerth defense . . . .”).
204
205
206
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3. Additional Implications of Applying a Framework
Focused on Reasonableness
If defendant-employers are granted summary judgment on fewer hostile
work environment claims, this may encourage employers to strengthen and
promote their anti-harassment policies and provide thorough anti-harassment
training. Applying an approach like the Third Circuit’s may encourage
employers to provide extensive corrective measures if inappropriate conduct
is reported. These changes would promote workplace measures that deter
harassment, creating safer workplace environments.
Employers may fear that under this framework they would never be able to
succeed on summary judgment, and that this approach would turn the defense
into a form of strict liability. However, the approach would not prohibit a court
from granting summary judgment for the defendant-employer, and the
defendant-employer would still have the ability to raise a strong defense at the
trial stage, if the defense does not otherwise settle the claim.
This approach would not be inconsistent with the manner in which other
employment discrimination claims are treated. In the context of age
discrimination claims, the Supreme Court has previously held that when a
plaintiﬀ brings forth credible evidence to establish his or her claim, liability
should not be decided as a matter of law. In Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Products, the Supreme Court held that in an instance where a plaintiﬀ
establishes a prima facie case of discrimination in an age discrimination claim
under the Age Discrimination of Employment Act and produces evidence for
the jury to reject the defendants’ nondiscriminatory explanations, the case
should not be decided as a matter of law, and should go to the jury.208 In
concurrence, Justice Ginsburg noted that “the ultimate question of liability
ordinarily should not be taken from the jury once the plaintiﬀ has introduced
the two categories of evidence” relevant to the claim.209 Thus, it would not be
incongruous if the jury frequently considered the application of the FaragherEllerth defense in the context of hostile work environment cases.
It could be argued that promoting sending such cases to the jury will result
in inconsistent outcomes, often unfavorable for plaintiﬀs. A study conducted
in 2003 that analyzed every wrongful discharge and employment
discrimination case reported in California in 1998 and 1999 found that there
were “low success rates of women and minorities in employment
discrimination cases,” which may be explained by judicial bias.210 However, it
530 U.S. 133, 149-52 (2000).
Id. at 155 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter: An Empirical Study of California Employment
Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge Jury Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates for Women and Minorities,
37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 511, 560 (2003).
208
209
210
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is possible that in the current era juries are more understanding towards
women’s hostile work environment claims. Further, the law in itself should
not unjustly bar plaintiﬀs’ ability to succeed on these claims.
In this era of #MeToo, the beneﬁts of adopting an approach that centers
around reasonableness outweighs the potential negatives. Adopting an
approach like the Third Circuit’s can be the change the law needs to provide
justiﬁed support for victims of workplace harassment.
CONCLUSION
Overall, federal courts’ interpretations and applications of the FaragherEllerth defense to cases of workplace harassment committed by an employee’s
supervisor have been inconsistent across jurisdictions and have created
unnecessary impediments to plaintiffs’ claims. Though the Supreme Court
in deciding Faragher and Ellerth sought to encourage women to report their
harassment and deter harm, the application of the affirmative defense has
been construed to frequently impede plaintiffs’ claims. Both elements of the
defense have been applied in inconsistent manners that do not achieve the
Supreme Court’s goals of deterring harm. Rather, the defense has been
applied in a way that seems to justify defendant-employers providing limited
measures to prevent harassment, while also failing to acknowledge that a
plaintiff-employee may have legitimate reasons for failing to report instances
of harassment to their employer.
Applying a framework that centers on reasonableness, like the Third
Circuit’s framework outlined in Minarsky v. Susquehanna County, would
resolve many of these issues. If other federal circuit courts adopted this
standard of reasonableness, it would reduce the inconsistent application of
both elements of the defense and would provide greater recognition to the
legitimacy of plaintiffs’ reasons for failing to report harassment. Adopting
this approach would aim to deter harm as the Supreme Court intended.
In the future, it would be beneficial for the Supreme Court to reevaluate
the viability of the Faragher-Ellerth defense to align with the traditional
policy goals of vicarious liability. Though the Court in Faragher and Ellerth
declined to apply vicarious liability to the affirmative defense, treating
claims of hostile work environment in the same manner in which intentional
torts are treated may further the policy of deterring harm, something to be
explored in a future work.

